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  Abstract   Corruption emerged as a key issue area in international relations and development in the 1990s. However, efforts to control corruption have, to date, been relatively unsuccessful. This has prompted international organisations, like the World Bank, to acknowledge that corruption is a political issue as much as it is an economic one. This shift has led to an increasing use of political economy analysis to inform the anti-corruption and governance reform operations of international organisations. This thesis examines political economy analysis as a feature of the expertise housed in the World Bank. It argues that because anti-corruption and governance expertise is essential to the legitimate authority of the organisation, there are risks to that authority if World Bank experts are unable to provide more than highly conventional recommendations for tackling corruption in developing countries. Commentators on development practice have suggested that integrating concepts from complexity science into political economy analysis and   adopting   an   “upside-down”   approach   to   development  might be useful to help generate new ideas for controlling corruption. However, this thesis argues that in order to do so, it is necessary to address the philosophical implications of complexity science for mainstream anti-corruption discourse, which is dominated by the positivist assumptions of neo-classical economics. To this end, the thesis argues that Manuel 
DeLanda’s   assemblage   theory   offers a social ontology in which the relevance of complexity science concepts for social analysis can be developed, and a way of thinking that emphasises how social entities emerge   from   “the   bottom   up”   without   reducing  causal explanations to individual human beings and their interests. Social networks, institutional organisations, and cities are examples of social assemblages, real emergent entities with causal power in the world. Mapping social assemblages in political economy analysis, and understanding the relations between social entities and different spatial scales, may reveal new ways of addressing corruption and the intensification of elite domination it enables.      
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Introduction   In 2003, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Its adoption represented  the  culmination  of  more  than  a  decade’s  activity to define, measure, and devise solutions to what  has  been  called   ‘an   insidious  
plague’,  an  ‘evil  phenomenon’  (United  Nations,  2004),  ‘a  cancer’  (Wolfesohn,  2000), and 
a   ‘most   difficult   area   of   development’   (World  Bank,   2012).   Corruption   emerged   as   an  issue area in international relations and development in the 1990s with the convergence of geopolitical ruptures and innovations in technical (mainly economic) knowledge. The end of the Cold War brought the liberalisation of the Soviet bloc and with it an unprecedented appropriation of public wealth by private interests. The dwindling of communism in Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia also removed the foreign policy imperative to turn a blind eye to the practices of rapacious elites in some of the states allied with the West. Many of those states remained in seemingly intractable conditions of low economic growth despite decades of development loans and aid.   Social science research in the traditions of public choice theory and the new institutional economics provided a convincing vocabulary to describe how the quality of institutions has a determinative effect on prospects for economic growth and prosperity, and how corruption undermines those prospects. This convergence intensified knowledge production, both within the academy and in international governmental organisations, into the causes and impacts of corruption and governance failure. The new knowledge questioned earlier theories that suggested corruption could be beneficial for economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 2006). It diagnosed the causes of corruption as lying with institutions riddled with incentives for the creation of economic rents, and it 
prescribed  a  range  of  best  practice  models  for  ‘good  governance’.  However,  despite  the  creation of an international normative framework that condemns corruption, and significant investments in governance reform and corruption control, systemic corruption and patrimonialism remain prominent features in many of the poorest countries.   
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Development   has   been   called   a   ‘wicked   problem’,   one   that   is   ‘not   amenable   to  
negotiation  or   short   term  plans,  or  …   that   can  be   solved   through  short-term  coercion’  (Copestake and Williams, 2012: 1). Institutionalist approaches to development indicate that efficient, fair institutions that protect property rights and encourage innovation are key to economic growth, but engineering the emergence of such institutions, and seeing them persist effectively, appears impossible. Those countries that have such “inclusive  institutions” developed them over the last four centuries through the interaction of various historically contingent processes that involved contestation, crises, and in some cases, revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In the 1990s and early 2000s, efforts to engineer institutional change to improve governance and address corruption relied on attaching governance-related conditions to development loans and aid. On the whole this conditionality failed to demonstrate lasting institutional change (De Janvry and Dethier, 2012). In many cases, the formal institutional changes implemented in line with loan and aid conditions have been undermined by the persistence of informal rules and existing power relations. Where institutions have changed, this has come from collective action emerging within the political community (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In response to this experience, international organisations are increasingly acknowledging that economic institutions are inextricable from political institutions, and that in order to address corruption risks in development projects and to promote improvement in economic governance, it is necessary at the very least to understand, if not to some extent participate in, the political dynamics that texture an issue area or sector (Copestake and William, 2012; DFID, 2009; World Bank, 2008).   In order to engage with the politics of institutional change, international organisations active in the field of development have integrated political economy analysis into governance reform efforts. Political economy analysis is a form of policy analysis, a practice that ‘aims  to  situate  development  interventions  within  an  understanding  of  the  prevailing political and economic processes in society specifically, the incentives, relationship distribution and constellation of power between different groups and individuals all  of  which  greatly  impact  on  development  outcomes’  (McLoughlin,  2012:  5). The increasing use of political economy analysis signals a “political   turn”   in  international anti-corruption and governance discourse. Where previously this discourse has been characterised by the identification of technical   “best   practice” 
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approaches to public sector management, acknowledgement of the political character of governance reform sees practitioners   searching   for   “feasible”   and   “second   best”  solutions. It includes an acknowledgement of the limits to what international organisations and aid donors can do to engineer national governance reform. This is also a pragmatic recognition of the relative failure of direct policy interventions to address corruption. It derives from experience rather than a specific social theory, although it draws on theoretical insights to explain why previous policies were not as successful as originally envisaged. This juncture offers an opportunity to interrogate how the problems of corruption and governance dysfunction are being reconstructed, and to explore other possible ways of posing these problems.  This thesis describes the current political turn in international governance and anti-
corruption  discourse  and  practice.    It  argues  that  the  UNCAC  can  be  read  as  “normative  
cover”   for   an   informal   expansion of the mandate of international organisations to 
include   “political”   issues   associated  with   governance   reform.   This   is   demonstrated   by  tracking efforts to “mainstream” anti-corruption, governance and political economy analysis at the World Bank. While this may represent an expansion of mandate 
consistent  with  the  tendency  of  bureaucracies  to   ‘create  knowledge  necessary  to  carry  
out   new   tasks’   (Barnet   and   Finnemore,   2004:   26),   the   political   nature   of   institutional  emergence and persistence implies limits to the extent to which international organisations can engage in such tasks. These limits are not necessarily defined by the 
organisations’  mandates,  but  by  their  form  as   international rational-legal bureaucracies deriving legitimacy from their expertise, objectivity and support for universalist rights discourses.  In order to identify these limits and yet still develop effective welfare enhancing policies within them, the way in which anti-corruption and governance dysfunction is conceptualised in political economy analysis is crucial.   The tools developed to assist practitioners to undertake political economy analysis are largely informed by economic approaches to questions of political choice and principal-agent dynamics. Here rational actors respond to the incentives created by the institutional context to further their interests. Systemic corruption and governance dysfunction are situations where enforcement and commitment mechanisms are insufficient to override incentives to act contrary to the public interest. The interactions 
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between actors and the relationships between formal and informal rules are very complicated, to the extent that some development scholars and practitioners have suggested that the institutional context of development exhibits features that may be amenable to explanation using concepts derived from complexity science (Copestake and Williams, 2012; Mowles, 2010; Ramalingam et al, 2009; Rihani, 2005). Complexity science refers to the behaviour of physical, chemical, biological and ecological systems that, broadly speaking, cannot be adequately explained by reductive methods of scientific enquiry.  A number of social scientists and theorists have suggested that social systems also exhibit this kind of complexity, and that complexity science concepts can be used in social explanation (Byrne, 1998; Harrison, 2006; Nowotny, 2005; Susteanu, 2005; Urry, 2005). In a recent contribution to the consideration of the relevance of complexity to development theory and practice, Copestake and Williams have argued that ‘confronting  complexity  entails  acknowledging  the  need  to  collaborate   in  order  to  build a fuller understanding of the problem. It also entails flexibility of response both to 
unforeseen   events   and   to   improved   analysis’   (Copestake   and  Williams,   2012:   2).   The  authors suggest that political economy analysis could be improved by integrating complexity concepts.  Although political economy analysis is described as   an   evolving   ‘art’,   the   tools  prescribed by the World Bank and other donors tend to utilise a common palette derived from neo-classical economics. Key to the authority of this language is its 
“scientificity”,   drawing   on   mathematics,   game   theory,   and   computer modelling to describe and predict the outcome of potential policy interventions. As such, the integration of concepts from complexity science into this body of theory would seem to be relatively straightforward. However, and crucially, complexity science challenges both the ontological assumptions that underpin positivist philosophies of (social) science, like neo-classical economics, and the generalisability of concepts across disciplines. In the natural sciences, complexity concepts, such as non-linear causality, 
emergence,   “edge  of  chaos”,  and  phase   space,  have  contributed  to  a  shift   to  realism  as  the dominant philosophy of science. This is in part due to the effect the insights of complexity science have in undermining the universal application of reductive methods of scientific enquiry. Neo-classical economics, on the other hand, remains a positivist and methodological individualist approach to social explanation. This is not to say that 
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the empirical insights from neo-classical economics, and particularly its extension in the new institutional economics, are not useful to examine the mechanisms of social organisation relevant to governance, but that in order for the concepts of complexity science to inform political economy analysis as an aspect of development practice, it is necessary to examine the philosophical and meta-theoretical assumptions that underpin it. As the problems of anti-corruption and governance dysfunction are being reconstructed, an engagement with complexity may contribute to a more   “accurate”  reconstruction, one in which ideas about means to ends relationships more closely align with reality. This thesis argues that rather than attempt to incorporate complexity concepts directly into existing political economy analyses, a greater theoretical effort is necessary. To this end, this thesis argues that   “assemblage   theory”   as   developed   by  Manuel DeLanda (2006) offers a way of integrating complexity concepts into political economy analysis that is sensitive to the philosophical implications of those concepts.  
The   term   “assemblage”   refers   to   ‘concrete   wholes   that   are   irreducible   and  
decomposable’   such   that   they   have   ‘clear   ontological   status’.      For   DeLanda, the term 
assemblage   ‘must   accommodate   the   epistemological   demands   of   both synthesis and 
analysis’   (DeLanda,   2011:   188).   Use of assemblage theory can help to clarify the ontological status of social institutions and organisations. It offers new ways of thinking about the social world with implications for how corruption and governance are conceived as issues in international relations.  The first chapter of this thesis will provide an explanation of how assemblage theory develops concepts from complexity science for use in social analysis, before exploring how assemblage theory can account for the autonomy of international organisations, identifying in particular the role that expertise plays in the emergence of the legitimate authority of these social entities. Chapter two moves to a discussion of the substantive issue of corruption, providing a history of anti-corruption discourse, a description of the expertise that has underpinned its development, and the connections between anti-corruption, governance and development. Chapter three follows the ways in which one international organisation in particular, the World Bank, has deployed this expertise to structure its corporate strategies and policies.  It argues that the increasing emphasis within the World Bank on the need for political economy analysis to underpin project 
planning   and   policy   development   signals   the   purposeful   integration   of   the   “political”  
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within the organisation’s technical remit. Chapter 4 describes the practice of political economy analysis, and its use in World Bank development policy and planning. Chapter 5 brings together the threads of the thesis to describes how political economy approaches are influencing World Bank policy—in particular its recent efforts to promote social accountability—and provides a critiques of an influential case study 
concerning  government  procurement  reform  in  the  Philippines   in  which  the  “political”  was limited to the political process of winning support for reforming legislation. The chapter and thesis concludes by arguing that assemblage thinking can contribute important nuances to political economy analysis, and by extension, to the authoritative 
expertise   necessary   to   support   the   legitimacy   of   international   organisations’  engagement in anti-corruption activities.   
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 Chapter One 
 Complexity, realism, and social explanation: the case for assemblage theory   
Social complexity  The point that social life is unavoidably messy is obviously mundane, but this very messiness is also recognised as the source of the creative (and destructive) dynamism so important to social change. To try to come to terms with this messiness, scholars from across the social sciences (including international relations) are exploring the usefulness of concepts from complexity science. This has been described as something of a ‘complexity  turn’ in  which  ‘the  term  “complexity”  is  “present”  and  doing  metaphorical, theoretical and empirical work within many social and intellectual discourses and 
practices  besides  “science”’  (Urry,  2005:  2).   Complexity science refers to a number of related concepts developed over the past fifty years, first in the physical science, and then in the life sciences (particularly biology and ecology). It  ‘investigates  emergent,  dynamic  and  self-organising systems that interact in 
ways  that  heavily  influence  the  outcome  of  later  events’  (Urry,  2005:  3).  Nicolis Grégoire and Ilya Prigogine, whose work has been instrumental in developing the concepts of 
complexity   science,   suggest   that   it   is   more   helpful   to   talk   about   ‘the   vocabulary of 
complexity’  (1989:  x)  rather than  a  theory  of  complexity.  Similarly,  they  suggest  that  ‘it  is  more natural, or at least less ambiguous, to speak of complex behaviour rather than 
complex   systems’   (1989:   8). Ramalingam et al, writing in the context of development 
practice,   also   suggest   that   complexity   science   is   ‘more   like   a   loose   network   of  interconnected and   interdependent   ideas’   (2009:   59)   than   a   theory,   and   have  summarised the main ideas, grouping them into three categories: complexity and 
systems,  complexity  and  change,  and  complexity  and  agency.  The  authors’  summary   is  provided below in box 1.   
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Box 1: The concepts of complexity science 
Complexity and systems: these first three concepts relate to the features of systems which can be described as complex: 1. Systems characterized by interconnected and interdependent elements and dimensions are a key starting point for understanding complexity science 2. Feedback processes crucially shape how change happens within a complex system 3. Emergence describes how the behaviour of systems emerges often unpredictably from the interaction of the parts, such that the whole is different to the sum of the parts. 
Complexity and change: the next four concepts relate to phenomena through which complexity manifests itself: 4. Within complex systems, relationships between dimensions are frequently nonlinear, i.e., when change happens, it is frequently disproportionate and unpredictable. 5. Sensitivity to initial conditions highlights how small differences in the initial state of a system can lead to massive differences later; butterfly effects and bifurcations are two ways in which complex systems can change drastically over time 6. Phase space helps to build a picture of the dimensions of a system, and how they change over time. This enables understanding of how systems move and evolve over time 7. Chaos and edge of chaos describe the order underlying the seemingly random behaviours exhibited by certain complex systems 
Complexity and agency: the final three concepts relate to the notion of adaptive agents, and how their behaviours are manifested in complex systems. 8. Adaptive agents react to the system and to each other, leading to a number of phenomena 9. Self-organisation characterizes a particular form of emergent property that can occur in systems of adaptive agents. 10. Co-evolution describes how, within a system of adaptive agents, co-evolution occurs, such that the overall system and the agents within it evolve together, or co-evolve, over time. (Source: Ramalingam et al, 2009: 8)  
The  authors   suggest   that   these   concepts   ‘can  be  used   in  a  highly   flexible  manner for example, in combination, individually, to augment existing models or frameworks or as a framework in their  own  right’  (Ramalingam,  et  al  2009:  63).  However,  while social life is certainly complex (in the common sense) and would seem to exhibit non-linear and 
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emergent properties, there is debate about the extent to which complexity science concepts apply in the social realm. Some scholars have suggested using insights from complexity to extend existing theories, such as the identification of “multiple simultaneous equilibria” in international relations (Ayson, 2012), or game-theory based simulations in economics and political science (Axelrod, 2006; Nunberg et al, 2010). Others have argued that scientific complexity implies a set of ontological commitments that are not necessarily shared by mainstream social science theories and that this makes the integration of complexity concepts problematic (Earnest and Rosenau, 2006). This is because mainstream theories tend to assign ontological priority to individual human beings (a strategy known as “methodological  individualism”), but social systems include collectives, organisations and networks, all of which have properties that cannot be reduced to the people on which they depend for their existence. While some social theories, for instance neo-realism  in  international  relations,  conceive  of  entities  like  ‘the  
state’   as   rational   self-interested actors, the ontological argument for assuming such 
“actorness” is difficult to sustain because it must assume that these entities are ontological prior to, in this example, the international system in which they interact (Joseph, 2010). A complexity analysis of the social realm must take account of how social entities emerge in time, on the understanding that the social (or the international) cannot be explained by the interaction of self-interested units outside of history.   Complexity science has had a significant impact on the philosophy of science, particularly in questioning the dominance of the reductive method of much scientific investigation. Scientific reductionism refers to the idea that the properties of entities at the macro level can be explained by the properties of the entities at the micro level on which they depend. One of the key insights from complexity science is that entities at the macro level can have novel properties that cannot be completely explained by the properties of their component parts, and that these novel properties can in turn cause changes in the behaviour of the component parts. These novel properties are referred to 
as   “emergent”.   Emergence is described   as   ‘the phenomenon or process by which complex structures or patterns arise on the basis of simple interactions’  (Bousquet  and  Curtis, 2011: 47). It challenges traditional approaches that assign ontological priority to the smallest components of an entity because novel properties imply ontological difference. When transposed to the social, with its interpersonal networks, institutional 
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organisations, cities, and markets all exhibiting novel properties, the ontological priority assigned to individual persons in mainstream neo-classical economics, as well as liberal and realist international relations theory becomes problematic. Reductionism is also evident in social constructivist and Marxist theories: reduction to language and structures of signification in the former, and macro-economic structure in the latter (a 
kind  of  “macro-reductionism”).    The challenge to the ontological priority of the individual is also a challenge to the philosophical positivism that underpins much social science theory. “Positivism” refers to a philosophy of science and social science that privileges sensory data, and analysis of that data, as the basis of knowledge. However,   as   Wight   and   Joseph   assert,   ‘in   the  philosophy of science, positivism has been rejected as an adequate model of science 
since   the   1950s’   (Wight   and   Joseph,   2010:   1).   The   current   dominant   philosophical  position in the natural sciences, they argue, is realism. Philosophers that adopt a realist 
position   in   relation   to   scientific  practice  generally  accept   three  principles:   ‘ontological  realism (that there is a reality independent of the mind(s) that would wish to come to 
know   it)’;   ‘epistemological   relativism   (that   all   beliefs   are   socially   produced)’;   and  
‘judgemental   rationalism   (that   despite   epistemological   relativism,   it   is   still  possible   in  
principle,  to  choose  between  competing  theories)’  (Wight  and  Joseph,  2010:  9).  The insights of complexity science have contributed to the predominance of realism in the philosophy of science. While positivism still more or less dominates mainstream social science, and certainly much of the social science undertaken by international organisations, there is considerable activity and debate on what a realist social science looks like. There are two broad groups working in this area: the “critical realists”, drawing on the work of the English philosopher Roy Bhaskar, and a more heterogeneous grouping influenced by the materialism of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. While scholars in the critical realist tradition and those influenced by Deleuze share much in common in terms of an antipathy to reductionism and a focus on specifying the reality of social entities at different “levels”, one of the key elements that differentiates them is their positions in relation to “essences”. For instance, Bhaskar argues that:  
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in general to classify a group of things together in science, to call them by the same name, presupposes that they possess a real essence or nature in common, though it 
does  not  presuppose  that  the  real  essence  or  nature  is  known  …  A  chemist  will  classify  diamonds, graphite and black carbon together because he believes that they possess a real essence in common, which may be identified as the atomic (or electronic) 
structure  of  carbon’  (Bhaskar,  1997:  210;  cited  in  Delanda,  2006:  128).  Similarly, the sociologist David Byrne, in his exploration of the value of complexity theory for the social sciences, sees the complexity concept of a “strange attractor” as approximating the Platonic “ideal form”, linking it to the ancient heritage of a philosophy of essences (Byrne, 1998: 29). This does not pose a particular problem for Byrne, who in the process of trying   to   put   ‘the   kibosh   on   postmodernism   and   poststructuralism’  
endorses  Bhaskar’s   critical   (or   scientific)   realism  as   ‘a  philosophical  ontology   that   fits  pretty well exactly with the scientific ontology underpinning the complexity 
programme’   (Byrne,   1998:   35).   However,   the   foundationalism   (that   is,   an ultimate reliance on essences as the foundational referents of knowledge) that Byrne identifies in Bhaskar can be as problematic to philosophical realism as it is problematised in the manoeuvres of poststructuralism because there is no way to account for how those essences came “to be”.   Getting rid of the need for essences was one of the main preoccupations for Gilles Deleuze in developing what Manuel Delanda has called his “virtual philosophy” (2002). This is achieved, in part, by arguing that all entities have a history, that for example, 
‘there  is  no  need  to  be  ontologically  committed  to  the  existence  of  “hydrogen  in  general”  
but  only  to  the  objective  reality  of  large  populations  of  hydrogen  atoms’  (DeLanda,  2006:  28). In  order  to  avoid  reification  of  the  categories  of  knowledge  DeLanda  argues  that  ‘we must instead focus on the historical processes that produce those products, with the 
term   “historical”   referring   to   cosmological   and   evolutionary   history   in   addition   to  human history’   (2006:   28). Deleuze also used concepts from complexity science, in 
particular   “phase   space”,   and   “strange   attractor”,   to   articulate   his non-essentialist materialist philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004; DeLanda, 2002). DeLanda has in 
turn   used   Deleuze’s   philosophy   to   develop   a   social   theory   informed   by   complexity  science that he calls assemblage theory. This move from empirical observation (the insights of complexity in the natural sciences) to ontology and philosophy, and on to 
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social theory is important if the concepts of complexity science are to be used for more than their metaphorical power in social explanation. As a relatively recent contribution (2006), assemblage theory has had limited application, and mainly in human geography, architecture, and urban studies, where key features, like   “territorialization” and 
“deterritorializaton” have particular resonance (Anderson and McFarlane, 2011; Palmås, 2007).  Yet  drawing  from  Weber,  Giddens  and  others,  De  Landa’s  work  has  relevance  for  the study of international relations, and particularly, this thesis will argue, for the organisations participating in global governance and international development.   
Assemblage theory  A philosophical realist and materialist social theory would argue that while social entities are not “mind-independent” (they would cease to exist if human minds did), they are autonomous from our conceptions of them. This is important because our conceptions (theories, models and classifications) may be wrong (De Landa, 2006: 1). 
One  of  these  conceptions,  a  very  common  one,  is  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  “society  as  
a  whole”,  and  that  society  is  like  a  human  body,  with  organs  and  properties  that  function  
together   in   a   totality.   This   “organismic   metaphor”,   celebrated   in   more   sophisticated forms by Aristotle, Hobbes, and Hegel among others, shares its rhetorical force with a general theory of totalities in which parts are related to wholes by relations of interiority. 
Relations   of   interiority   exist   where   the   ‘component   parts   are   constituted by the very 
relations  they  have  to  other  parts  of  the  whole’  (DeLanda,  2006:  9).  This  is  problematic  in terms of accounting for the emergence of novel properties,   because   ‘allowing   the  possibility of complex interactions between component parts is crucial to define mechanisms of emergence, but this possibility disappears if the parts are fused together 
into  a  seamless  web’  (DeLanda,  2006:  10).  Accounting   for  parts-to-whole relationships without relying on relations of interiority is a primary objective   of   DeLanda’s  assemblage theory in order to guard against the tendency to build up the social world as a totality. ‘Assemblage  connotes  emergence  rather  than  resultant  formation’  (Anderson  and McFarlane, 2011: 125), but crucially it is an emergence resulting of relations of 
exteriority. This involves distinguishing  
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the properties defining a given entity form its capacities to interact with other entities. While its properties are given and may be denumerable as a closed list, its capacities are not given they may go unexercised if no entity suitable for interaction is around and form a potentially open list, since there is no way to tell in advance in what way a given entity may affect or be affected by innumerable other entities (DeLanda, 2006: 10).   
Assemblages   then,   are   ‘wholes   characterized   by   relations   of   exteriority’   such   that   ‘a  component part of an assemblage may be detached from it and plugged into a different 
assemblage  in  which  its  interactions  are  different’  (DeLanda,  2006:  10).  The whole may not survive the excision of the part, but the part can. In a totality, or seamless whole, the 
linkages  between  component  parts  are  logically  necessary,  but   ‘in  an  assemblage  these  
relations  may   be   only   contingently   obligatory’   (DeLanda,   2006:   11).   DeLanda repeats the example from Deleuze and Guattari of two species (a wasp and orchid) in a close and critical symbiosis, but argues it could also apply to the organs of an animal (or human) in so far as particular organs have an evolutionary history (albeit a long one) that render the relations to other organs and the whole contingently obligatory. As such, an individual animal (or human) is an assemblage, and so is a two species symbiosis. The 
former  has   clearly  defined  physiological  boundaries  and   ‘tight   integration between its 
component  organs’  (DeLanda,  2006:  12),  while   the   latter   is  made  up  of   two   individual  assemblages (the wasp species and the orchid species), interacting with capacities expressed by properties of the physical and climatic environment. This also indicates that assemblages can be wholes composed of organic and inorganic entities, their identities conditioned (in historical processes) by the relations between their component parts and their environment, but not constituted by them. The heterogeneity of assemblages is important because it clarifies that social assemblages are more than collections of people: they are composed of human, material, informational, and other biological and physical entities and intensities.   As well as relations of exteriority, assemblages have two key dimensions. In the first, the components of an assemblage may play a material or expressive role, or a mixture of 
both   ‘by   exercising   different   sets   of   capacities’   (DeLanda,   2006:   12).   The   second dimension concerns   the   ‘variable   processes   in   which   these   [material and expressive] components become involved and that either stabilize the identity of an assemblage, by 
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increasing the degree of its internal homogeneity or the degree of sharpness of its boundaries [territorialization], or destabilize it [deterritorialization]’   (DeLanda,   2006:  12). Crucially both territorialization and deterritorialization can be at work in the same 
assemblage   at   the   same   time,   such   that   ‘one   and   the   same   assemblage   can   have components working to stabilize its identity as well as components forcing it to change 
or   even   transforming   it   into   a   different   assemblage’   (DeLanda,   2006:   12).   Social  
assemblages   comprise,   at   the   very   least   ‘a   set   of   human   bodies   properly   oriented  (physically  or  psychologically)  towards  each  other’,  with  one  of  the  most  simple  being  a  conversation between two people. These minimum material components are joined by expressive components such as language and symbols, but also behaviours and other non-linguistic social expression.  Territorialization  plays  an  essential  synthetic  role  ‘since  it  is  in  part  through  the  more  or  less permanent articulations produced by this process that a whole emerges from its 
parts   and   maintains   its   identity   once   it   emerges’ (DeLanda, 2006: 14). Deterritorialization, meanwhile, is any process that ‘either   destabilises   spatial  
boundaries   or   increases   internal   heterogeneity’   (DeLanda,   2006:   13).   In   assemblages  this dynamic is joined by another key synthetic process played by what DeLanda calls 
‘specialised   expressive   entities’,   the   most   obvious   being   genes   and   words: ‘[w]hile territorialization provides a first articulation of the components, the coding performed by genes or words supplies a second articulation, consolidating the effects of the first 
and  further  stabilizing  the  identity  of  assemblages’  (2006:  15).  While  genes  and  words  are ‘special expressive entities’, for DeLanda they are also assemblages comprising physical components and semantic combinations. He calls them “special assemblages” 
because   their   emergence   represented   ‘critical   thresholds   in   the   history   of   the   planet  
when   physical   expressivity   has   become   functional’   thereby   enabling   a   proliferation  of  new assemblages (2006: 14). However, these special assemblages should be seen as 
‘simply  one  more  component  entering  into  relations  of  exteriority  with  a  variety  of  other  
material  and  expressive  components  …  operating  side  by  side  with  non-genetic and non-linguistic processes of territorialization and deterritorialization’  (DeLanda,  2006:  16).   In describing the processes of assemblage formation it is important to note that the isomorphism in territorialization and coding across assemblages does not mean social 
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assemblages at different spatial scales are comparable (as implied by the organismic 
metaphor):   ‘many   social   assemblages   are   not   highly   coded   or   highly   territorialized’  (DeLanda, 2006: 16). However, DeLanda asserts that the processes of assembly are 
‘processes   that   must   be   conceptualised   as   recurrent’,   and   that   as such, assemblages always exist in populations,   ‘however  small  …  generated  by  the  repeated  occurrence  of  
the  same  processes’  (2006:  16).  In  terms  of  the  social,  ‘interactions  between  members  of  a collectivity may lead to the formation of more or less permanent articulations between them yielding a macro-assemblage  with  properties  and  capacities  of  its  own’  (DeLanda,  2006: 17). It is the emergence of macro-assemblages from collectivities, the members of which may themselves be assemblages, that provides the link between the micro and 
macro   in   assemblage   theory.   This   allows   ‘the   replacement   of   vaguely   defined   general  
entities   (like   “the  market”  or   “the   state”)  with   concrete  assemblages’   (DeLanda, 2006: 17). Micro and macro become, not absolute positions, but terms for related assemblages at different spatial scales. 
 
Social mechanisms in assemblage theory  One of the key insights of complexity science is the non-linearity of cause and effect in many processes. Linear causality refers to constant conjunctions of cause and effect, in which the effect is implied by the cause. It is the basis of logical deduction, in which such and such a cause, under such and such conditions will produce a specific effect. Non-linear causality, on the other hand, is characterised by ‘systems … which do not display proportionality between input and output, and in which small influences can result in large effects’   (Bousquet   and  Curtis,   2011:  46), such that the precise effects of a cause cannot be predicted, but the probability of a range of effects may, with enough information, be stated. Non-linear   processes   also   features   critical   thresholds   (“tipping  
points”)  at  which  small  causes  produce  radical changes. DeLanda  argues  that  ‘if  causality  is to provide the basis for objective syntheses causal relations must be characterised as 
productive, that is, as a relation in which one event (the cause) produces another event (the effect) not just implies it’   (2006:   20).   As   such,   the   ‘most   that   one   can   say   about  external causes in a population is that they increase the probability of the occurrence of a 
given   effect’   (2006:   21). In addition to causal interactions, social assemblages also 
contain   ‘mechanisms   which   …   involve   reasons and motives’ (DeLanda, 2006: 19). For 
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DeLanda,  while  ‘reason  may  be  exemplified  by  traditional  values  and  personal  emotions,  
motives   are   a   special   kind   of   reason   involving   explicit   choices   and   goals’   (2006:   23). Traditional reasons would not require choice in terms of setting a goal for action: the value of the goal is given by the tradition, and not through the intentional choice of the actor. In a similar way desire constitutes a reason, fixing the object of desire without necessarily involving deliberate choice. Motives are defined by matching means to ends, requiring both the identification of a goal from a number of potential goals, and the identification of the means for achieving that goal. The motive mechanism most closely aligns with rational individualist social theories, and as a mechanism can produce causal effects either from deliberate action (such as the action taken by drafters of a constitution), or collective unintended consequences of intentional action, that is, as a 
‘statistical  result’  (for  example,  prices  in  a  market)  (DeLanda,  2006:  24). Similarly, while beliefs (traditional reasons) and desires can be socialized by, for example, family or school (in processes that may include intentional motivated action, for example, in 
curriculum  design),  ‘socialization  must  …  be  conceived  in  probabilistic  terms’  (DeLanda, 2006: 25). The emphasis on mechanisms of reasons and motives distances assemblage theory from rationalist social theories that suggest utility maximization as the 
predominant  “rule”  in  social  or  economic  activity,  without rejecting rational calculation as an explanation for causal action.  
Essences and ontology in assemblage theory  As noted above, one of the key concerns in the materialism of both DeLanda and Deleuze is getting rid of the need for essences in realist philosophy.  This is achieved primarily by historicizing the identity of any given assemblage at any scale. The identity of an assemblage is always the product of a process (territorialization, and in some cases, coding) and it is always precarious, since other processes (deterritorialization and 
decoding)  can  destabilize  it’  (DeLanda,  2006:  28).  This  means  in  effect  that  ‘the  ontology  of assemblages is flat since it contains nothing but differently scaled individual singularities (or haeccieties)’  (DeLanda,  2006:  28). This is not to say that we are unable to categorise assemblages for the purpose of analysis, but it does guard against reifying those categories. In place of essential categories, assemblage theory draws on the complexity science concept of “phase space” the set of possible positions for a physical 
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or chemical system. Phase spaces are topological, in so far as they are subject to continuous deformations along many possible dimensions,  and  ‘their  structure  is  given  
by  topological   invariants  called  “attractors”,  as  well  as  by  the  dimensions  of   the  space,  
dimensions   that   represent   “degrees   of   freedom”,   or   relevant   ways   of   changing   in  concrete physical or chemical dynamical systems’   (DeLanda,   2006:   29). Attractors define the long-term tendencies of systems, with a simple example being the point at which a pendulum rests. In biology and social science, phase spaces are much more complex than in physics and chemistry and tools to investigate their structure are not available.   For   this   reason,  DeLanda   refers   to   them  as  possibility   spaces,   and   ‘ventures  the hypothesis that they will also be defined as phase spaces with a much more complex distribution of topological invariants (attractors)’   (2006:   29). DeLanda, and Deleuze before him, refers to these topological invariants as universal singularities because they are singular or special topological features that are shared by many different systems. 
Universal  singularities  are  “discovered”  by  systems  through  evolutionary  processes  and  provide the   “mechanism-independent”   causes   formerly   provided   in philosophy by 
“essences”.  In  taxonomic  terms,  the distributions of these universal singularities replace 
Aristotle’s   genera,   while   individual singularities approximating   or   “circling”   the  universal singularity replace his species. The genera we are familiar with are more 
simply   described   as   ‘body   plans’: ‘a   set   of   universal   singularities  …   that   structure   the  space of possibilities associated with  the  assemblage’  (2006:  30).  As noted above, the link from genera to species is not a process of logical differentiation, but one of historical 
differentiation, ‘a process involving the divergent evolution of all the different vertebrate species that realize the abstract body-plan’ (2006: 29). ‘Thus’   says   DeLanda,   ‘while  persons, communities, organizations, cities and nation-states are all individual singularities, each of these entities would also be associated with a space of possibilities characterised by its dimensions, representing its degrees of freedom, and by a set of 
universal  singularities’  (2006: 30). He provides an example using Max Weber’s  typology  of hierarchical authority: traditional, rational-legal, or charismatic. Each of these extreme types would constitute a universal singularity, with the three universal 
singularities,   along   with   the   ‘degrees   of   freedom’   that   define   the   possibility   space,  
together   constituting   the   ‘diagram’   or   ‘body   plan’   of hierarchical authority structure. Actual organisations   ‘will   tend   to   display   a   heterogeneous   composition   of   authority  
structures  approximating  [these]  extreme  forms’  (2006:  69). 
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 This brief description of assemblage theory is important to establish the ontological status of social entities. It provides for the crucial link between the micro and macro in social explanation, not as absolute positions, but as relationships at different spatial scales. DeLanda argues that there is little explanatory purchase offered by a micro to macro relationship that  relies  on  the   individual  person  and  “society”,  or   the   individual  
firm   and   “the   market”.   Assemblage   theory   requires   specification   of   concrete  assemblages, like the organisational assemblages involved in the government of a particular territory, its material and expressive components, and the processes of territorialisation and coding that provide it with a more or less durable identity. This assists in identifying the novel properties of assemblages, and tracking how the capacities related to those properties are exercised in social relations.   In developing assemblage theory, Manuel DeLanda refers to institutional organisations as assemblages of persons and material and expressive components, using contemporary and historical examples from Europe and the United States. He acknowledges the Western focus of his examples, but argues that this reflects his belief 
that   ‘some   of   the   properties   of   social   assemblages,   such   as   interpersonal   networks   or  institutional organizations, remain approximately invariant across   different   culture’  (2006: 6). As well as this Western focus, Robert Deuchars has also pointed out that 
‘DeLanda’s   use   of   assemblage   theory   and   social   complexity   [is]   not   well   developed  
beyond   the   domestic   realm’   (2010:   178).   This   thesis will sketch an extension of assemblage theory to international organisations, and to their interactions with assemblages in non-Western countries to promote economic development. DeLanda 
cautions   that   in   order   to   avoid   ‘assemblage’   becoming   a   general   reified   category,   it is critical to always examine concrete examples. As such, this thesis will focus on the World Bank, first as an assemblage, and then as an actor exercising capacities, specifically capacities related to the constitution of social problems and goals, with the particular problem area being the impact of corruption and governance dysfunction on economic development.  
 
 
 
 
  19 
International organisations as assemblages  It is important to understand the organisational form of international organisations, their emergent properties, and the capacities that those properties enable. Mainstream approaches to international relations theory Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism have traditionally conceptualized international organisations as epiphenomenal, as reducible 
to   ‘arenas   through  which   others,  mostly   states,   acted’   (Barnett   and   Finnemore,   2004:  viii) toward ends associated with, respectively and summarily, projecting and maintaining power, solving collective action problems, and extending the reach of capitalist social relations. However, Barnett and Finnemore have shown the ways in which international organizations have autonomy as actors in world politics. This autonomy, they argue, is based on the legitimacy and authority derived from their legal-rational bureaucratic form.  The legitimate authority that Barnett and Finnemore identify in international 
organisations  can  be  seen  as  an  emergent  property,   ‘not  a  commodity  but  an  attribute  
generated   from   social   relations’   (2005:   162).   This   attribute,   or   property   in  DeLanda’s  terms, enables international organisations to exercise power; that is, the ability to produce, ‘in and  through  social  relations,  …  effects that shape the capacity of actors to determine their own circumstances and  fate’  (Barnett  and  Duvall,  2005:  8). Power here is a capacity exercised in the interaction between the organization and other social entities. Barnett and Finnemore suggest that international organizations, like other organizations in the rational-legal bureaucratic form, exercise both regulative and 
constitutive  power.  The  regulatory  effects  of  power  come  from  ‘the  ability  of  an  actor  to  
manipulate   incentives   to   shape   the  behaviour  of   another  actor’,  while   the   constitutive  effects of power derive from ‘the  ability  to  create,  define,  and  map  social  reality’  (Barnett  and Finnemore, 2004: 30). Of the two, regulatory power is the more conceptually straightforward: it involves the promulgation of rules and the enforcement of those rules. But the development of rules, on the other hand, will often arise from the operation of constitutive power deployed to classify the world, construct problems, fix meanings, and diffuse norms (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 31-34).    
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While legitimate authority is the property that provides for the exercise of power as a capacity, the extent to which it is an emergent property of the assemblage depends on its autonomy from the properties of its component parts. This can be investigated by examining whether the changing of a component part (e.g. an individual staff member) changes the property, as well as its ability to react back on its component parts, providing them with constraints and resources. An international organization that slavishly follows the dictates of the United States Department of Treasury, for example, is unlikely to have emergent authority. Any authority it has derives from the United States Treasury, and it is unlikely to have much effect on the policies the Department pursues. David  Leon  calls  this  ‘institutional endogeneity …  a situation in which the more instrumental institutions are in performing functions for states under anarchy, the less autonomous and causally consequential they become’   (2011: 226-227). Most international organizations, on the other hand, are separate entities from those they rely on for resources, and derive autonomy in three ways. The first of these is delegated 
authority,  and  arises  when  states  put  an  international  organization  ‘in  charge  of  certain  
tasks’  (Barnett  and  Finnemore,  2004:  22).  The  “state”  here  is  used  as  a  short  hand,  but  if  it were necessary to be specific, the concrete mechanism of delegation, and the governmental assemblages at the national level responsible for developing and monitoring the delegation would also need to be identified. For instance, the United States Department of Treasury may be responsible for developing United States policy in relation to its voice on the Executive Board of the World Bank, but in doing so it needs to interact with a range of other entities both governmental and non-governmental 
(World  Bank,  2011).  Delegated  authority  is  ‘always  authority  on  loan’  and  to  be  able  to  
use   it   international   organizations   ‘must  maintain   the   perception   that   they   are   faithful  servants to their mandates and masters’   (Barnett   and   Finnemore,   2004:   22).   This  requires the mobilization of expressive components of the organizational assemblage, like programme evaluations that show how state funds are being used. Evidence that the authority is emergent would be the ability of an international organization to shift the limits of its mandate (even if informally) and to develop new tasks for delegation. In this respect, delegated authority can be considered as a resource dependency for international organizations, one tied to other resource dependencies like funding and access to information (for example, national statistics).   
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The second source of authority for international organizations is moral authority. Moral authority relies on expressive components of an assemblage and in the case of 
international   organizations   is   ‘dependent   on   a   contrary   discourse   of   states   protecting  
their   own   national   and   particularist   interests’   while   international   organizations  
‘emphasize   their  neutrality,   impartiality,   and  objectivity’   in  ways   that   ‘are   intended   to  
contrast   their   universal   concern   with   the   self   serving   claims   of   states’   (Barnett   and  Finnemore, 2004: 23). The moral authority of international organizations also derives from and is expressed in the exercise of capacities related to their bureaucratic form, which emphasizes detachment and political neutrality.  The third source of authority for international organizations is expert authority. Expert authority relies on both the material and expressive components of an assemblage. In the material sense, expertise allows for the matching of means to ends, while the 
objectivity   and   detachment   associated   with   expert   knowledge,   and   the   “epistemic  
communities”  that  may  form  around a field of enquiry provide expressive components. 
Barnett  and  Finnemore  note  that  the  ‘deployment  of  specialized  knowledge  is  central  to  the very rational-legal authority that constitutes bureaucracy in the first place because what makes such authority rational is, at least, in part, the use of socially recognized 
relevant   knowledge   to   carry   out   tasks’   (Barnett   and   Finnemore,   2004:   24).   Expert  authority also intersects with both moral authority and delegated authority because, on the one hand the use of socially recognized knowledge engenders trust and on the other, expertise enables tasks to be carried out. Expertise also has a depoliticizing effect with 
‘quantification  vastly  enhanc[ing]  the  power  of   ...  claims  of  objectivity  and  impartiality’  (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 24). As  Barnett   and   Finnemore   suggest,   ‘to   the   extent  that they can quantify the social world and develop mathematical models of important relations in it, experts can achieve strong intersubjective agreement on the nature of the world,  the  nature  of  its  problems,  and  appropriate  policy  responses’  (2004:  69).  Integral  to this quantification is a distancing from the object of study, an operation that is essential to the power of expertise and knowledge. The very disinterestedness with which experts pursue their objects of study is integral to expert authority. In Barnett 
and   Finnemore’s   words,   ‘one   of   the   paradoxical   implications   of   quantification   is   that  
bureaucrats  become  powerful  only  by  making  themselves  appear  powerless’  (2004:  69).   
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Expertise, then, is a key source of authority for international organizations that sits alongside the rational-legal authority conferred upon them at their creation (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 707). The autonomy this provides means that international organizations develop in ways and take on tasks that their creators could not have 
anticipated.  Barnett   and  Finnemore  argue   that   the   ‘characteristics  of  bureaucracy  as  a  
generic  cultural  form  shape  international  organisation  behaviour’  (1999:  700)  and  that this is more important to understanding the behaviour of international organizations than the intentions of the states that created or fund them. Weber saw the cultural form of bureaucracy as a great human achievement, but one with the very real tendency to domination born of an unprecedented ability to order reality. Yet because any such 
ordering  must   be   an   artificial   compartmentalization   of   a   ‘very  messy   reality’   (Barnett  and Finnemore, 2004: 64), bureaucracies are prone to making mistakes. Barnett and Finnemore ask why it is that international organisations that  ‘often  produce  undesirable  and even self-defeating outcomes repeatedly’   can   persist ‘without punishment, much 
less   dismantlement’   (1999:   701).   According   to   neo-realist and neo-liberal theories of international relations, an international organisation that repeatedly makes mistakes should become less and less useful to the states that support it, leading to its dismantlement. The fact that this does not happen, or at least happens very rarely (and not to the major international financial institutions established following the Second World War), supports arguments for the moral and expert sources of international organization authority as emergent, as compared to delegated authority, which could, in the absence of the emergent forms, be more easily withdrawn. Barnett and Finnemore 
point  to  ethnographic  studies  of  organisations  which  suggest   that   ‘organisational  goals  are strongly shaped by the norms of the profession that dominate the bureaucracy and in which interests themselves vary, often in flux, debated, worked through interactions 
between  the  staff  of  the  bureaucracy  and  the  world  in  which  they  are  embedded’  (1999:  706). This indicates that the evolution of knowledge in a field of expertise, something that is not confined to the bureaucracy, can in part account for the persistence of organisations implicated in crises. Discourses are assemblages (DeLanda, 2006: 75) that can enter into relations of exteriority to function as components of international organizations. When the mistake is with the discourse,  and  “body of knowledge” itself, it is a mistake shared with other assemblages universities, national governmental, professional associations in which the discourse assemblage also functions as a 
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component. In the vocabulary of assemblage theory this is a process of deterritorialisation, one that has the potential to alter organizational identity. The deterritorialisation process functions across both material and expressive components, in realigning resources on the one hand, for example, and signaling learning and engagement on the other. The persistence of the problem, or the object of study and action, despite previous unsuccessful forays, also justifies maintaining a capacity to develop new responses. As the next chapter will show, the history of anti-corruption discourse and policy can be seen as an example of how, though relatively unsuccessful to date, international organisations and donors continue to look for new ways of achieving 
‘good  governance’ in developing countries. 
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 Chapter Two 
 Anti-corruption and good governance discourse   This chapter plots a brief history of anti-corruption discourse and describes the social science knowledge that underpins its most recent incarnation. It then charts the development of a set of international declarations, agreements and conventions that approximate an international anti-corruption  “regime” and shows how this regime has become central to discourses of economic and social development.   
A history of corruption  In her sketch of the history of international anti-corruption discourse, Padidah Ala’i  identifies three broad phases in rhetoric and policy. The first is characterised by 
‘geographical   morality’   and   bound   up   with   colonial   administration,   the second revisionism and cultural relativism associated with processes of decolonisation, and the third by an international regime heavily reliant on economic and social science methodologies.   
Ala’i   identifies a beginning in 1787 with the impeachment in the House of Lords of Warren Hastings, the former Governor-General of Bengal. Edmund Burke, himself intensely involved in the reform of British administration, accused Hastings of creating a 
corrupt  system  of  government,  ‘whose  sole  purpose  was  to  exercise  “arbitrary  power”  to  
plunder  India  without  restraint  or  respect  for  the  rule  of  law’  (2000: 883). In response, Hastings contended that the actions of one operating in India do not have the same 
‘moral  qualities’  which  similar  actions  would  have  in  Europe  (Ala’i,  2000: 887), and that although arbitrary power was used, his extraordinary economic successes and service to 
the   East   India   Company   and   the   Crown  more   than  made   up   for   it   (Ala’i,   2000: 888). 
Burke  did  not  dispute  Hastings’s   argument  that  conditions   in   India  were  different,  but  asserted that a universal morality should apply to the actions of British officers 
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regardless of where they were. Burke condemned Hastings’s  defence  as  appealing  to  a  
‘rule  of  geographical  morality’.    
Burke’s  appeal   to  a  universal  morality  won  out,   and  Hastings  was   impeached.     But  he  
was   later  acquitted  because   ‘the  House of Lords held that Burke had not been able to 
prove  “a  corrupt,  habitual,  evil  intention”  as  was  required  for  the  crime  of  bribery’  (Ala’i,  2000: 889). This case provides a useful introduction to a history of anti-corruption discourse because both the prosecution and defence relied on moral arguments symptomatic of, on the one hand, the ideology of imperialism, and on the other, its 
practice.  Burke’s  argument  ‘subscribed  to  two  fundamental  principles’  that  there  is  ‘only  
one  morality  applicable  to  all  men’,  and  that  ‘merit  cannot  extinguish  crime’  (Ala’i,  2000: 891), but in acquitting Hastings, the House of Lords tacitly condoned his argument of 
geographical  morality  based  on  the  justifications  inherent  in  success.  Ala’i  suggests  this  
represented   ‘the  acceptance of the view that Asian countries constitutionally required despotic rulers and subscribed to lower standards of morality, particularly with regard 
to  the  duties  owed  by  a  sovereign  to  his  people’  (2000: 891). But Hastings impeachment was not without its lessons. His successor in Bengal, Cornwallis, cleaned up the Indian civil service by dismissing from it all Indians, using the rule of geographical morality to justify not British bribery and corruption in India, but British dominion.   Whatever the noble intentions of Burke and his contemporary defenders of moral 
universality,   this   history   suggests   that   the   ‘moralist   approach’   to   anti-corruption is 
deeply  problematic,  and  can  lend  itself  to  ‘an  apriori  condemnation  of  all  non-Western societies and cultures  as  morally  inferior’  (Ala’i,  2000: 895). Hastings defended himself in the categories advanced by Burke, arguing that it was necessary for Britain to intervene in India on Indian terms, which were, regrettably, morally questionable. Cornwallis and his successors  solved  Hastings’s  quandary  by  imposing  British  power  in  Asia on British terms, backed by a moral universality. This universality was later 
consolidated  by  the  deliberate  British  policy  to  create  ‘a  class  who  may  be  interpreters  between us and the  millions  whom  we  govern’  (Macauley’s  ‘Minute  on  Indian  Education’ (1835), cited in Spivak, 1988: 77).   
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If an appeal to moral universality was a feature of the long colonial period (nevermind its practice), defended ever more fiercely as the twentieth century slouched forward, the period of decolonisation was marked by a foregrounding of difference in anti-corruption discourse. In the 1960s the prevailing view was that ‘the  definitions  of  corruption  and  bribery varied with societal values and inherited cultural  and  religious  traditions’  (Ala’i,  2000:   897).   This   was   coupled   with   the   thesis   that   corruption   is   a   ‘necessary   and  
inevitable  part  of  the  modernization  process’  (Ala’i,  2000:  897),  offering  ‘the  integration  of various groups who otherwise would not be able to participate in the political process’  (Ala’i, 2000:  897);  introducing  ‘efficiency  into  the  system  where  there  is  none’  (Ala’i, 2000: 890) by   securing   ‘exemptions   from   costly   rules   that   hamper   the  
development  of  the  private  market’  (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: xiv); and, in the absence of 
effective  political  institutions,  presenting  ‘an  acceptable  alternative  to  violence  in  times  of change when it facilitates elite integration and humanizes government for non-elites’  
(Ala’i,  2000: 901).1 While this revisionist discourse was intended to counteract the smug 
moral   certainties   underpinning   imperial   domination,   according   to   Ala’i   it   ‘ironically  
perpetuated  the  rule  of  geographical  morality,  while  denying  the  relevance  of  morality’  
(Ala’i,  2000:  902)  by  providing  the  ‘intellectual  and  moral  justification  for  multinational  
corporations  …   to   apply a different, lower standard of conduct to their actions in the 
South   than   they   would   apply   to   their   actions   in   the   North’   (Ala’i,   2000: 902). It strengthened  the  second  arm  of  Hastings’s  defence,  that  success success in business, in modernisation, in avoiding violence justifies a “lower” standard of conduct.  The third broad phase of anti-corruption discourse, the one that remains in the ascendant today, enters in the 1980s and 90s with the production of evidence to show that the success defence for legitimising bribery and corruption is unfounded. There is now a broad consensus on the harm corruption does to economic development such that, according to Hansen,   ‘like   trafficking,   terrorism,   money   laundering   and   several  other issues corruption has come to be viewed as something which is to be prevented or 
eliminated   through   concerted   regulatory   efforts   at   the   international   level’   (Hansen,  2011: 252). This current  phase  features  a  rejection  of   ‘geographical  morality’,  replaced by a      ‘reliance   on   economic   arguments’,   and   ‘heavy   reliance   on   social   science  methodology and empirical data to prove detrimental economic consequences of                                                         1 See also Khan, 2006; Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964. 
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corruption  in  the  South’  (Ala’i, 2000: 904). In the economic and social science work on corruption a new set of universal   technical   “best  practice” truths replaced a set of old and discredited moral universals.   
Anti-corruption expertise  This section explores the knowledge and expertise that has underpinned the shift to a technical discourse on the deleterious impacts of corruption on economic development. In its relationship to development, corruption has been conceptualised as an economic issue, amenable to explanation by economic theory. Economists, as Rose-Ackerman 
point  out,  ‘do  not  like  to  engage  in  “good”  and  “bad”  type  judgements’,  but  the  very  word  
“corruption”  carries  force  as  a  ‘moral  category  that  signifies  putrefaction  and  rot’.  In  the  1990s economists sought to separate the moral dimensions of corruption from the 
economic   dimensions   by   focusing   on   ‘monetary   payments   to   agents   (both   public   and  private) to induce them to ignore the interests of their principals and to favour the 
interests  of  the  briber  instead’  (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: xiv). The principal-agent dynamic has remained at the heart of the economics of corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: xvii). The principal-agent   relationship   is   inherently   problematic   because   ‘[u]nless   the  principal is perfectly informed at zero cost  about  the  actions  of  the  agent  …  the  agent  is  given scope for opportunistic behaviour which benefits himself or herself and usually 
also  reduces  the  welfare  of  the  principal’  (Toye,  1995:  55).  When transposed to politics, the inherent risks in the principal-agent relationships are coupled with lack of credible commitment in situations where there are no mechanisms for principals (citizens) to effectively hold agents (leaders) to account. Corruption as a development problem involves information assymetries between publics and their elected or unelected leaders, and between those leaders and their agents in bureacracies. This dynamic also informs definitions of corruption. For instance, Transparency International, the non-governmental organisation that has perhaps contributed the most to elevating 
corruption  to  an  issue  area  in  international  relations,  defines  corruption  as  ‘the  abuse  of  
entrusted  power  for  private  gain’  (Transparency  International,  2012).    Corruption is generally categorised as either low-level or systemic. Low-level corruption is associated with officials bestowing   benefits   where   supervisors   ‘cannot   perfectly  
monitor  official  behaviour’  (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: xviii). It includes speed payments in 
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situations where the regulatory system imposes delays and other costs. This kind of 
corruption  ‘can  lead  to  inefficient  and  unfair  distribution  of  scarce  benefits,  undermine  the purpose of public programs, encourage officials to create red tape, increase the cost of doing business and limit entry, and   lower   state   legitimacy’   (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: xix). High-level   or   systemic   corruption   can   involve   situations   where   ‘a   branch   of   the  public sector may be organized as a rent-extraction   machine’;   ‘a   nominal   democracy  may have a corrupt electoral system, with   money   determining   the   outcome’;   and  
situations  where  ‘governments  engage  in  large  projects  and  transfer  assets  in  ways  that  
have  a  significant  effect  on  the  wealth  of  domestic  and   foreign  business  organisations’  (Rose-Ackerman, 2006: xix). Economists have therefore sought to investigate ways of structuring incentives so that principal-agent relationships operate effectively.   Systemic corruption suggests the failure of institutional mechanisms to structure and enforce efficient principal-agent relations. The key step in constructing corruption as a development problem is to show that this slippage in the principal-agent relationship negatively impacts economic growth. While there remains debate about the effects of different forms of corruption on growth (Khan, 2006), the international consensus has 
converged  on  findings  like  those  of  Paulo  Mauro  that  ‘bad  institutions  affect  the  growth  
rate  …  by  lowering  the  investment  rate’  (1995:  695)  and  that  therefore  ‘that  corruption  lowers the private marginal product of capital (for example by acting as a tax on the proceeds of investment)’ (1995: 700). The mission for international development organizations and donors then becomes to encourage the development   of   “good  
institutions” that can provide confidence to investors, and that can channel the revenue 
gained  from  investment  into  “pro-poor”  economic  development.  The key theoretical approaches that have informed the economics of corruption, and the development of anti-corruption and good governance policy from the 1980s to today are 
public choice theory and the new institutional economics.  
Public choice theory  Public choice theory applies neo-classical economic rational decision making principles to political decision making, to explain how economically inefficient policies are 
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introduced through the individual utility maximizing behaviour of public officials. Public choice theory is important for understanding the emphasis in the anti-corruption discourse of the 1980s and 1990s on government failure, as it shows how the incentives faced by individual politicians lead to the creation of policies that can harm prospects for economic growth. This had a profound influence on the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s, by providing a rationale for minimizing government intervention in the economy on the basis that government involvement will likely lead to a less economically efficient and welfare enhancing outcome compared to “the market”. In many countries at the beginning of the 1980s, governments were heavily involved in markets, producing industrial products, closely regulating financial services, and setting prices. These activities created an array of incentives for individual officials to act contrary to public welfare. It seemed to follow that limiting government’s   role   in   the   economy   would  restructure and reduce these incentive, allowing the market to find an equilibrium based on real supply and demand.  The broadly positive experiences (in terms of GDP growth) of neo-liberal reform in developed countries became the object lesson in how to address economic growth problems in developing countries. However, by the close of the 1990s any hopes of a broad brush solution to economic development were dashed. Neo-liberal reforms, while certainly creating winners, also had a profoundly destabilising effect, in many cases increasing opportunities for corruption. The key difference it seemed, was not in the extent of reform for some developing countries implemented neo-liberal reforms with a greater tenacity than many developed countries but in the insitutional context of reform. Developed countries boasted regulative institutions for defining, enforcing and arbitrating contracts, and could ensure that as direct government involvement (ownership, control, investment, direction) was withdrawn, governmental processes (regulative, informational, judicial) remained in play. Where these processes and insitutions were weak or non-existent, the withdrawal of government was not an opening to an efficient market, but to a free-for-all in which the strongest prevailed. This realisation led to a refocusing on the role of institutions in economic change and development, and the rise of the new institutional economics as the key theoretical approach in anti-corruption discourse and policy development.    
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The new institutional economics   Institutionalism in economics has a long history dating back to the nineteenth century.  
The   “old   institutionalism”   focused   on   the   role   of   technological   change   in   economic  organization, particularly the   organization   of   firms.   In   contrast,   the   “new   institutional  
economics”   attempts   to   ‘incorporate   the   concepts   of   public/rational   choice   into  economic decision-making’   hoping   to   ‘suggest   something   about   the   relationship  between the individual and the collective’  (Harriss  et  al,  1995:  2).   It   is,   in  summary,   ‘a  development of neo-classical economics to include the role of transaction costs in exchange and so to take account of institutions as critical constraints on economic 
performance’  (Harriss et al, 1995: 3).  The  strap  line  “institutions  matter”  emerged  with  the work of Douglass North, Mancur Olsen, and Richard Posner among others, which modified the neoclassical economic paradigm to show how incentives and individual 
behaviour   are   structured   and   conditioned   by   institutions.   It   ‘opened   for   analysis   the  
“black   box”   of   the   firm   and   other   institutions’   (Hodgson,   2002:   xiv).   For   North, an 
economic   historian   and  winner   of   the  Nobel   Prize   in   Economics,   ‘institutional   change  shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding 
historical  change’  (1990:  3).  Here, institutions  are  the  ‘rules  of  the  game  in a  society’,  the  
‘humanly   derived   constraints   that   shape   human   interaction’   (North,   1990:   3).   The  
economic  usage  of  the  term  includes  ‘cultures,  ideologies,  property  relations,  particular  
organizations   forms’   (Toye,   1995:   64),   with   formal   institutional   structures including 
‘conventional  property   rights  but   also  any  other  enforceable   constraints   such  as   taxes  
and  subsidies’  (Khan,  1995:  72).  They   ‘affect   the  performance  of   the  economy  by  their  
effect   on   the   costs   of   exchange   and   production’.   For   North,   ‘integrating individual choices with the constraints institutions impose on choice sets is a major step toward 
unifying   social   science   research’   (1990:   5).   The   relationship   between   institutions   and  economic development is summed up in the following:  Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory, determine the opportunities in society. Organizations are created to take advantage of those opportunities, and, as the organizations evolve, they alter the institutions. The resultant path of institutional change is shaped by (1) the lock-in that comes from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and organizations that have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by those institutions and (2) the 
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feedback process by which human beings perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set (North, 1990: 7).  Key to the new institutionalism is a critique of rational behaviouralist theories of economics. These critiques centre on the lack of information actors have about the world. Writing in the late 1980s, North could still suggest that neoclassical behaviouralist assumptions work well for finance, where a lot information and other prerequisites exist, but not for most other systems of exchange (North, 1990: 20-21). Given the radical information poverty that actors experience, ‘institutions   exist   to  
reduce   the  uncertainties   involved   in  human   interactions’   (North,  1990:  25).  The  other  central feature of the new institutional economics is  its  modification  of  the  “rationality 
postulate”   in   neo-classical   economics.   Rather   than   values   being   constant   and   ‘that  individual economic agents select the most efficient means of maximizing rationally 
chosen  ends’,  North  and  others  argue  that  ‘individuals  make  choices  on  the  basis  of  their 
mental   models’   (Harriss et al, 1995: 3). Mental models differ widely and are in part culturally derived. Mental models in a sense reinforce the formal articulation of institutions at the individual level, and are used to explain behaviour that is individually rational in a collective context. This is how institutions enable individuals to overcome social dilemmas by changing the incentives for individually rational action.   The recognition of the importance of institutions in reducing transaction costs provided a middle way between those who saw lack of economic growth as a problem of government failure, and those who saw it as a problem of market failure. According to 
Toye,   the   new   institutional   economics   suggested   that   neither   of   these  was   ‘invariably  
correct’.  Instead,  the  task  in  developing  policy  would  be  to  ’estimate  the  respective  net  changes in transaction costs in comparison with the anticipated allocative improvement, to find out whether policy should be favouring additional government intervention or 
further   privatisation’   (Toye,   1995:   58).   The   new   institutional   economics   both  
‘undermines   an   ideal   view   of   governments   as   benevolent   and   omnicompetent’   (Toye,  1995: 58) and renders markets just  ‘one  type  of  social  device,  whose  performance  is  to  be judged   against   that   of   others’   (Toye,   1995:   54).   The   choice   between   social   devices  then becomes highly context dependent. In this way the new institutional economics 
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‘brought  about  a  shift  in  terms  of  the  discourse  about  development’,  but  one  that  ‘has  to  be encompassed within a more thoroughly political economy’  (Harris,  1995:  12-13).  
Anti-corruption and development 
 While corruption the abuse of entrusted power is a social phenomenon identifiable in all societies, it is predominantly in emerging economies and developing countries where corruption is described as a systemic problem. Drawing on the influence of public choice theory and the new institutional economics, corruption has become constructed as a problem for economic development and a legitimate task area for those actors working in development assistance. But this was not always the case. Prior to the 1980s, for instance, bribes paid by multinational companies in overseas jurisdictions were tax deductible in many Western countries. However, even by the late 1970s, the diversion of public funds into private accounts, the dulling of competition effects as a result of preferential business agreements secured through bribes, and the embedding of rent-seeking behaviour in public management led many to question the revisionist wisdom about the efficiency, integrative, and pacifying effects of corruption (Mauro, 1995; Krueger, 1974).  The growing recognition of the problems associated with corruption led to the beginnings of what might be described as an international anti-corruption regime.2 Regimes can be seen as assemblages in their own right, and to a greater or lesser extent, like discourses, can form component parts of other assemblages. In this 
sense,   the   adoption   of   ‘principles,   norms,   rules   and   decision   making   behaviour’  
(Krasner,   1982:   1)   as   “operating   procedures”   of   national-level governmental organisations (through laws ratifying the UNCAC, for example) is an example of a regime 
entering   into   “relations   of   exteriority”   with   governmental   assemblages,   performing  materially (for example in prompting changes in the allocation of resources within a bureaucracy) but perhaps most importantly, expressively. The anti-corruption regime can itself be seen as forming part of a larger concatenated international regime addressing transnational crime, with the very concept of crime expressed in normative 
terms  that  facilitate  enforcement  and  “technical”  intervention.    
                                                        2 Following    Krasner’s  definition  of  international  regimes  as  ‘principles,  norms,  rules,  and  decision  making 
procedures  around  which  actor  expectations  converge  in  a  given  issue  area’  (Krasner,  1982:  1). 
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A 1975 United Nations (UN) resolution on bribery in international financial transactions was followed in 1977 by the passing in the United States of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and subsequently the active promotion by the United States of laws forbidding bribery in international commercial transactions. The 1980s saw attempts to develop a UN anti-corruption convention, but this was hampered by the Group of 77 developing countries’   insistence   that   it   be   preceded   by   a   code of conduct on multinational corporate behaviour (Ala’i,   2000). This was not possible, and so the convention remained in draft. Anti-corruption discourse received a shot in the arm in the 1990s as the world watched the economies of the former Soviet countries shrink, some, like Russia, by half, as they became dominated by corruption, graft, and the rise of the oligarchs. The demise of soviet communism also made it less defensible for Western governments to ignore corrupt governing practices by ostensible allies. At the same time, and as outlined above, the views of economists within the academy and in international organisations began converging on the importance of institutions and the conclusion that corruption was inimical to economic growth. From 1996 a UN resolution on corruption was  an  annual   feature,  signalling   ‘a  normative  embrace  of   the  virtues  of  
capitalism,   buffered   by   commitments   to   democratic   governance’   (Bukosvansky,   2006:  187). Attention returned to the overseas activities of Western corporations, with the (non-binding) UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, and governments in the form of an International Code of Conduct for Public Officials. This signalled international agreement to the principle of legal equivalence of laws forbidding bribery of domestic public officials, with officials in other jurisdictions.  A year later, developed countries agreed to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. This agreement went further than the UN declaration by requiring OECD members to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials, and, according to Bukovansky, ‘clearly  echoes  the  turn  toward  a comprehensive concern with governance and the ethics of governance as a legitimate 
objective  of  international  institutions’  (2006:  192).  All  34  OECD  members,  and  five non-members Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Russia, and South Africa have now adopted the 
Convention  (OECD,  2012).  The  OECD  Convention  focuses  on  ‘improper  advantage’  but  as  the Commentaries on the Convention clarify, it does not require the criminalization of 
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small   ‘facilitation  payments’  made  to  public  officials   to   ‘perform  their   functions’.  While  
‘generally  illegal  in  the  foreign  country  concerned’  the  criminalisation of such activities 
by   other   countries   ‘does   not   seem   a   practical   or   effective   complementary   action’.  
Countries  are  instead  encouraged  to  ‘address  this  corrosive  phenomenon  by  such  means  as support for programmes of good  governance’  (OECD,  2011:  15).    While these efforts at building normative consensus at the international level were 
underway,   the   diagnosis   of   “institutional   failure”   as   a   key   determinant   in   low   growth  and persistence of crises in low-income countries led international development organisations to focus on the external policy instruments that could be used to change 
the  political  equilibrium  ‘through  enforcing  greater  transparency  and  accountability  on  
political  elites’  (Adam  and  Dercon,  2009:  176-177). In the 1990s, anti-corruption policy focused on reducing the incentives for corruption, and providing mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement of formal laws prohibiting corrupt practices. Changing incentives to reduce corruption involved a reduction in the extent of government regulation, increasing salaries for public officials (made easier by reductions in their total number), creating legal  deterrents,  greater  administrative  transparency  and  ‘more  
effective  judicial  processes  for  dealing  with  those  charged  with  corruption’  (Khan,  2006:  222). Development aid and loans became conditional on implementation of these kinds 
of  governance  reforms.  In  this  “structural  adjustment  era”,  the kinds of macroeconomic policies prescribed by international organizations included the privatization of state-owned industries, intended to, among other things, reduce the opportunities for rent creation and foster efficiencies borne of competition, and financial openness, where increased financial mobility would encourage policy stability and good governance as governments sought to retain investment.  In concert with the introduction of these reforms, the World Bank, Transparency International (established in 1993 by former World Bank staff), and others, developed comparative governance indicators to measure levels of corruption and perceptions of governance and institutional quality across countries. While the use of such governance indicators is fraught (Langbein and Knack, 2008), they provide broad metrics to indicate whether policy and governance changes have an effect on rates of corruption and corruption control. On the basis of these indicators, the liberalisation reforms 
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prescribed right through the 1990s to address government failure have, on the whole, been shown to be ineffective in addressing corruption (Khan, 2006: 222). The persistence and in some cases the intensification of corruption through liberalisation, has made it clear that deregulation per se does not lead to the kinds of economic or social outcomes envisaged by the set of market-favouring policies described by John Williamson as the   “Washington   Consensus”   (Williamson, 1990). With this realisation, there was a  ‘radical  shift  in  the  rhetoric  of  globalisation’  away  from  ‘the language of the market’   to that   of   quality   of   government,   focusing   on   ‘governance, accountability, transparency, and  democracy’ (Chandhoke,  2002:  44)  with  corruption,  the  ‘mythological  
hydra’  (Marquette,  2004:  426),  barring  access  to  modernity.  With the OECD Convention and UN Declaration focused on the activities of bribe givers, the attention of the international anti-corruption efforts swung round to focus on bribe-taking government officials (Bukovansky, 2006: 187). The 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development brought together international organisations, donors and developing countries to chart a new approach to development. Louis Pauly has described how Monterrey represents a reinvigoration of the role of the UN Economic and Social Council in economic development as it lent its legitimacy to the World Bank and Iinternational Monetary Fund (IMF), organisations refocusing after a decade of controversial market-based policies closed with the Asian financial crisis (2005). Those at Monterrey agreed that the fight against corruption was a priority, but within the context of the Monterrey consensus, this would need to be carried out in a development framework more sensitive to “ownership” by developing countries.  Those at Monterrey 
also  committeed  themselves  to   ‘negotiating  and  finalizing  as  soon  as  possible  a  United  Nations convention against corruption in  all  its  aspects’  (United  Nations,  2002:  15).    Both the supply and demand side of corruption is addressed in the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), which entered into force on 14 December 2005 and currently has 140 signatories and 160 parties. The  Convention  ‘represents  a  significant  consolidation of the anti-corruption   consensus   in   the   international   community’  (Bukovansky, 2006: 187) and includes provisions for extradition, confiscation of assets, 
the  ‘explicit  extension  of  anti-corruption to the  private  sector’  (Bukovansky,  2006:  187),  and prohibits the tax-deductability   of   bribes.   ‘It   draws   together   all   the   threads   of   the  
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governance   and   development   discourse   into   a   coherent   bundle’   (Bukovansky,   2006:  188). The negotiation, agreement and ratification processes for the Convention have increased the visibility and priority of addressing corruption for both donor States and developing countries (ITAD, 2011), and has been hailed by some as signalling a near global acquiescence to a norm of political universalism (Mungiu-Pippidi et al, 2011). The next chapter examines how one of the main participants in the development of the UNCAC and anti-corruption discourse in general, the World Bank, is using this new normative framework to create new tasks for itself and other donors to encourage “good  
governance”  in  developing  countries. 
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 Chapter Three   Knowledge, expertise and politics: The role of the World Bank in anti-corruption discourse and policy   Until our borrowing members achieve a greater level of comfort with dialogue on governance matters and our own experience with it matures further, it is advisable that delicate policy issues are discussed only by senior managers (Directors and above). Technical issues, of course, can continue to be handled at staff level.  Barber B. Conable, World Bank President (World Bank, 1991: 2)  The World Bank has been a leading actor in developing an international discourse on corruption and good governance. As discussed in the previous section, this has resulted in the formation of a set of resolutions and agreements approximating an international regime. This section traces the evolution of expertise and policy within the World Bank that both contributed to the formation of this regime, and found new resources in its 
consolidation.   Following   DeLanda’s   warning   against   abstracting   the   concept   of  assemblage, the World Bank is treated as a concrete assemblage, with its work on anti-corruption and governance having both (de)territorializing and (de)coding effects on the organisation.   As a concrete assemblage, the World Bank is a hieararchical authority structure in the rational-legal  form.  This  kind  of  assemblage  is  one  ‘in  which  the  relations  of  exteriority  between components are exemplified by a contractual relation through which some persons transfer rights of control over a subset of their actions   to   other   persons’  
(DeLanda,   2006:   70).   While   many   organisations   ‘tend   to   be   mixtures   of   different  
authority   forms’   (DeLanda,   2006:   69),   international   organisations   in   many   way  approximate the extreme of the rational-legal form. The recruitment of almost all staff is based on expertise and merit. Even relatively junior staff display advanced degrees from top universities, many of them in the United States. Although the topmost levels of 
management   are   subject   to   “representative”   pressures   (for   instance,   the World Bank 
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President is always an American), recent incumbents cannot be said to exhibit particularly extraordinary charismatic qualities. The separation of incumbent from office is achieved in the World Bank, as in other international organisations, perhaps more fully that it is in many national-level government organisations because these organisations lack the same kinds of legimitacy resources that accrue to national-level governments and their bureaucracies through democratic procedures. As DeLanda suggests,  ‘with  a  full  separation  of  office  from  incumbent  the  organization  itself  may  be  considered a goal-oriented  corporate  actor’  (2006:  70).  However,  while  the  “actorness”  of the organisation is shored up to   the   extent   ‘its   resources   (physical,   technological, 
legal,   financial)   are   linked   to   formal   positions   or   offices,   not   to   their   incumbents’,   the  World Bank must enter into relations of dependence with other organisations in order to secure those resources (DeLanda, 2006: 76). The World Bank has obvious resource dependencies on national governmental organisations, and this is reflected in the make up of its Executive Board, comprising representatives of the 25 principal funders of the Bank.  This point about resource dependency is important as it clarifies the relationships 
between   “states”   (used   here   in   the   shorthand)   and   international   organisations   as  relations of exteriority. States, or more correctly, national governmental organisations, are not (usually) component parts of an international organisation, although they may exert authority over an international organistion linked with resource dependence (delegated authority, financial, informational and legal resources). While autonomous from states, international organisations like the World Bank also enter into assemblages with national-level organisations and other actors in specific issue areas.  As with all social assemblages, the critical material component of the World Bank is its 
staff,   its   ‘human  bodies’   (DeLanda,  2006:  72).  For   the  purposes  of this thesis, it is not necessary to list the many material and expressive components of the Bank, or to explore in detail its organisational structure, but it is helpful to follow DeLanda in distinguishing those components that play an expressive role expressing the legitimacy of the authority from those playing a material role, that is, involved in the 
‘enforcement   of   obedience’   (DeLanda,   2006:   68).   The   Bank   has   traditionally   enforced  obedience internally through review and evaluation mechanisms (as well as human resources practices), and externally through conditionality on loans, and criteria for access to development funding. Its engagement with corruption and governance, as well 
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as the perceived failures of the 1990s, has intensified policing of its internal and external facing processes to manage corruption risks.  This functions to ensure the behaviour of Bank staff does not impact its legitimacy in addressing corruption in development, which derives to a great extent from its own integrity as well as the expertise it houses.  
Economic  and  social   science   knowledge   is  key   to   the  Bank’s   legimitimate  authority   in  poverty reduction and economic development policy. Yet like all rational-legal bureaucratic legitimacy, it hinges on   the   ability   to   ‘regularly   produce   the   desired  
outcome   that   expresses   [its]   legitimacy’   (DeLanda,   2006:   71).   Corruption   and  governance dysfunction in poor countries is so problematic because it undermines the 
ability  of  the  Bank  to  regularly  produce  “pro-poor”  economic  development  outcomes.  As  anti-corruption   becomes   an   ‘overarching   corporate   strategy’   (De Janvry and Dethier, 2012: 19) for the Bank there is the risk that a failure to address corruption will undermine the legitimacy of the Bank, and reduce its ability to draw its resources. As 
DeLanda   points   out   ‘[t]he   more   complex   the   outputs   and   production   processes,   the  
more  uncertain  the  evaluation,  and  the  less  clear  the  technical  expression  of  legitimacy’.  
In   these   situations   ‘when   documenting   and   justifying their efficiency to other 
organisations’,   organisations   will   ‘stick   to   ceremonial   “rituals   of   rationality”   to   buffer  
themselves  from  criticism’  (DeLanda,  2006:  71).  In  this  sense,  expertise  and  knowledge  production about corruption and governance reform are expressive components. This is evident,   for  example,   in   the  World  Bank’s  “open  development”   initiative,  which   in  part  
positions   the   Bank   as   an   “open   source”   knowledge   resource   provider   for   other  organisations engaging in development-related projects at different spatial scales (World Bank, 2013).  This openness models the organisational behaviour that the Bank 
is  trying  to  inculcate  in  developing  countries  and  indicates  belief  in  a  “network”  model  of  social innovation, borrowing from the moral authority of the open source movement in software development. At the same time it draws a distinction between itself and national governments consistent with the ‘contrary   discourse’   of   international  organisation   ‘neutrality,   impartiality   and   objectivity’   noted by Barnett and Finnemore 
(2004:  23).   In   this   sense   “openness”   is   a   rhetorical   construct   that   is   contrasted to the 
“closed”   circulation   of   information   necessary   to   facilitate   corrupt   practices.   So   while engagement with corruption holds risks for the Bank in terms of the link between resource dependency and the measurement of achievements, it has facilitated the 
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creation of new tasks, new areas for potential success, and reset the limts of its mandate. The next section will trace the development of governance and anti-corruption as central concerns for the Bank, and key areas to exert its expertise.  
The World Bank and governance  Marquette has pointed out that prior to the 1990s the World Bank had avoided explicitly acknowledging consideration of corruption risks in its lending decisions. Taking into account issues like corruption, human rights and a “country’s  political  structure” were 
considered   to   be   inconsistent   with   the   Bank’s   Articles   of   Agreement   (1944)   which  proscribe political activities. For instance, Article 10 section 10 of the Articles of Agreement state:  The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially (World Bank, 1944; cited in Marquette, 2004: 413).  
“Governance”  was   first   formally   introduced  on  the  World  Bank’s  agenda   in 1991, with the consideration by the Executive Board of a discussion paper, Managing Development: 
the Governance Dimension. In his foreward to the paper, the then World Bank President 
Barber  B.  Conable  noted  that   ‘governance  is  an  emotive  word,  and  more  importantly, a 
potentially  contentious  issue  internationally  and  within  many  of  our  member  countries’  (World Bank, 1991: foreward). The discussion paper identified the main elements for 
the   Bank’s   approach   to   governance,   comprising   the   need   to   ‘continue   to   exploit 
opportunities   for   improving   development   management’   by,   for   example,   ‘assisting  borrowers [to] break up monopolies, removal of controls and other avenues for 
corruption’;   focusing   efforts   on   those   countries   committed   to   improving   public   sector  management;  and  ‘assist  the  design  of  highly  differentiated  responses,  taking  account  of  
the   country’s   institutional  needs,   its  political   economy,   its   society,   and  history’   (World  
Bank,   1991:   iv).   The   paper   included   an   acknowledgement   of   the   need   to   ‘foster   an  
“implementation   culture”  within   the  Bank   and   to   sensitize   staff   to   the   need   to   handle  
issues   in  this  area  with  humility,  sensitivity  and  caution’  (World  Bank,  1991:  v).  While  
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the Bank had a history of participating in projects with borrower countries on public sector reform, this paper represented the successful construction of governance as a specific activity area for the Bank (and for international development assistance more 
broadly),   for   although   there   was   ‘some   apprehension   among   [Bank]   borrowing  members  that  …  staff  might  exceed  the  Bank’s  mandate’  and  ‘divergent  views  expressed  
by  the  Executive  Directors  on  the  subject’  the  approach  outlined  in  the  discussion  paper  
received  ‘widespread  support’  (World  Bank,  1991:  forward).  Although the 1991 discussion  paper  included  a  section  of   ‘reflections  on  corruption’  as  one of the key dimensions of governance, in a 2000 speech, then World Bank president James Wolfensohn described how corruption was effectively off limits for the Bank when he was appointed in 1995. He went on to say:  So, I came out in my Annual Meeting speech, I said corruption is a cancer and it is not political but it is social and it is economic and, therefore, I am allowed to talk about it. And if you politicians think that it is political, that is your problem. I think it is social and economic. Therefore, I can talk about it. (Wolfensohn, 2000; cited in Marquette, 2004: 421)  The contemporary anti-corruption activities associated with the UN Declaration and OECD Convention, and the nascent anti-corruption norms that these represent, also provided a degree of cover for a more direct engagement by the World Bank on corruption. It would no longer be a political phenomenon, but, with close to universal condemnation, an economic one.   In 1997, the  World  Bank  announced  that  it  would  implement  a  ‘systematic  frame-work for addressing corruption’.   Corruption  was   explicitly   framed   as   ‘a development issue’,  and something central to ‘the assistance it provides to countries and in its operational work more   generally’ (World Bank, 1997: 2). Driven by Wolfensohn, the 1997 framework set out a range of actions in four broad areas: prevention of corruption in World Bank projects and programmes, assisting countries that ask for help in combating corruption, mainstreaming concern with corruption in planning, programme, and lending decisions, and contributing to international efforts to fight corruption (World Bank, 1997; World Bank, 2000). By  2000   the  Bank  had   requests   from   ‘more   than   two  
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dozen   countries   …   to   deal   specifically   with   corruption’,   and  was   working   with   ‘more  
than  95  countries  …  [on]  broadly  defined  public  sector  and  institutional  reform’  (World  Bank, 2000: 2). To minimize fraud and corruption in its projects, the World Bank established an Oversight Committee on Fraud and Corruption in 1998, and established a 
24  hour  ‘hotline’  that led  to  ’44  companies  and  10  individuals  being  debarred  from  Bank  
contracts’   (World  Bank,  2000: 3). Lending for governance and public sector reform in 
this  period  ‘grew  as  a  share of total Bank lending, to more than 25 percent of total Bank 
lending  in  volume  terms’,  starting  in  1999,  and  reaching  35  percent  by  2002  (de  Janvry  and Dethier, 2012). The increased emphasis placed on governance reform should have led to progress, but by 2005-2006 donors were increasingly acknowledging that 
‘governance   reforms   required   the   right   political   incentives,   credible   champions,   and  appropriate demand-side  pressures’   (de   Janvry  and  Dethier,  2012).  The  World  Bank’s  response was to develop a new strategy with anti-corruption at its centre, but this time with the political dimensions foregrounded for analysis. The 2007 Governance and 
Anticorruption  Strategy  (GAC)  represented  a  ‘highly  negotiated  ….  [c]orporate  strategy  that sought to change the way the  Bank  did  business’  (de  Janvry  and  Dethier,  2012:  25).    
The politics of corruption and governance  The World Bank defines governance as comprising ‘the   form  or  nature  of   the  political  regime; the processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources; and the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policy and deliver goods and services’  (World  Bank,  2012:  9).   The latter 
two  dimensions   fall  within   the  Bank’s  mandate,   and   have   been   subject   to   progressive  articulation through Bank policy since the early 1990s. But as suggested by Marquette, it is not so easy to separate these dimensions   and   view   them   in   a   ‘purely   economic  manner, which excludes considerations of, for example, power structure, class and 
ethnic  divisions,   and  historical   trajectories,   so  essential   to  a  political   approach’   (2004:  422-423).  Marquette’s  concern  is  that  through its work on corruption, the Bank is using its technocratic, specifically economic, identity to assume a political role beyond its Articles of Agreement. Yet at the same time, the issue of corruption is so thoroughly political and replete with the play of power, that it is impossible not to encroach on the political in trying to understand and address it. In fact, in its recent update to the 2007 
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GAC strategy, the Bank has   recognized   the   insufficiency   of   relying   on   ‘economic 
governance  alone’, noting the need   for   ‘a step change in its grasp of the opportunities 
and   constraints   in   governance,   within   the   parameters   of   its   mandate’   (2012:   9).   In talking about governance and corruption in his April 2011 address to the Peterson Institute, then Bank President Robert Zoellick echoed his predecessor, stating:  These are not dry technical issues. These are not luxuries reserved only for developed countries.   They reflect on the quality of governance. They improve public policy. They signal integrity.  They communicate respect for the public. They treat public office as a trust.  They may sound political, but they are certainly economic (Zoellick, 2011).  The Bank then is continually probing the parameters of its mandate; searching out languages and framing that provide   space   to  pursue   “political”   issues,  but   at   the   same  time transmuting them into the language of economics. While the efforts of the World Bank and others to stem corruption in developing countries has been relatively ineffective to date, one area of success is its contribution to international efforts to create an international normative consensus against corruption.  As suggested above, this consensus is expressed in the UNCAC. Since the UNCAC was introduced, a key anti-corruption strategy for donors has been to encourage governments to accede to and ratify the Convention. In ratifying the Convention countries commit to governance norms that include participation in government decision making by citizens and civil society groups. This is emphasized, for example, in Article 13(1), which holds that:   Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, within its means and in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, to promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside the  public  sector  …  in  the  fight  against  corruption  and  to raise public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of the threat posed by corruption (UN, 2004: 15)  Such formal normative commitments provide greater scope for donors, including the World Bank, to engage with non-governmental groups in governance reform and anti-corruption activities. Some of these activities would previously have been considered as 
“political”,  but  increasingly  the  “political”  is  being  recast in a technical light:  as  “political  
economy”.  However, as Khan points out, ‘[r]esponding  to  institutional  failures  requires  
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not just an understanding of the balance of power but also requires us to take political 
positions’   (1995: 71). The World Bank can only take political positions where it can appeal to an international normative consensus for support. In this respect, Bukovansky 
argues   that   ‘a   survey  of   this   consensus   [in relation to corruption] reveals ommissions and oversights which cause analysts to evade and obscure, rather than directly engage, 
core  problems  of  politics  and  ethics’.  What  is  obscured,  according  to  Bukovansky  is  the  political orientation of anti-corruption   discourse   toward   ‘an   extension   of   multilateral  efforts to expand and solidify the institutional foundations  for  a  global  market  economy’  (2006: 182). Anti-corruption   discourse   ‘diverges   from   existing   trade   and   monetary  
regimes  …  in  its  relatively  explicit  evocation  of  the  moral underpinnings of a successful market   economy’   (2006:   182).   This   creates   an   ethical   problem   in   that   the   ‘liberal-rationalist approach to corruption has to do with the external imposition of contingent 
standards   on   societies   that   are   not   fully   participating   in   defining   those   standards’  (Bukovansky, 2006: 184). Intrinsic to the ethical problem related to the legitimacy of international good governance standards, is the practical problem that this lack of legitimacy creates. Standards with less legitimacy are less likely to be enforced. This missing component is important because understanding the conditions of possibility for the emergence of institutional organizations that exhibit values of efficient and effective governance can help reveal why they do not emerge under different conditions. The most recent developments in anti-corruption discourse and policy turn on this realization: that while countries may formally adopt norms of ethical universalism through ratifying the UNCAC, this will only affect institutions both formal and informal to the extent that such norms are localized through highly contextualized political processes, including collective struggle. As detailed in the next chapter, it is for this reason that the World Bank has, along with other organizations donor organizations, promoted the greater use of political economy analysis to understand the dynamics that impact prospects for anti-corruption and governance reform, and to point 
to   “social   accountability”   initiatives   as   the   way   to   engender   collective   reform   action  (World Bank, 2012).  
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 Chapter Four  
 Political economy analysis and governance reform   
An  important   indication  of   the  explicit   “turn”  to  politics   in  anti-corruption discourse is the integration of political economy analysis into World Bank policy and programme development. This chapter introduces the practice of political economy analysis, and 
provides  an  account  of  the  World  Bank’s  own  evaluation  of  its  use  of  political economy analysis.   Political economy analysis is a form of policy analysis (as opposed to an academic 
practice)  intended  to  ‘situate development interventions within an understanding of the prevailing political and economic processes in society’  (McLoughlin, 2012: 5). It is ‘a  way  
of   thinking   and   a   tool   for   practitioners’   (Copestake and Williams, 2012: 1) who are 
‘concerned   with   the   interaction   of   political   and   economic   processes   in   a   society:   the  distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the 
processes  that  create,  sustain  and  transform  these  relationships  over  time’  (DFID,  2009:  4).  The World Bank and other international development organisations are not alone in integrating political economy dimensions into project planning and decision-making. The private sector is increasingly using sophisticated political risk assessments to inform investment decisions, and the OECD has also developed guidance to support its 
member  countries   to  build   ‘successful   advocacy  and  coalitions   for   reform’   (Fritz  et   al,  2009). The increasing interest in political economy analysis as a planning and decision-making tool in development is in part attributable to the normative shifts in development practice in the “post-Monterrey era”. Although the World Bank 
emphasised   the   importance   to   its   work   of   “political”   analyses   before   Monterrey  particularly as a key input into Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)3 (Desai, 2011: 7) the 2007 Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Strategy includes an explicit                                                         3 PRSPs are the  World  Bank’s  main  strategy  documents  for  developing  and  articulating  reform  options  with borrower countries. 
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direction to include political economy analysis in Bank project planning to enable better understanding of corruption risks, and the opportunities for governance reform. Subsequently, the Bank has published several papers on political economy analysis,4 and developed tools for integrating it into its programmes and decision-making mechanisms. The frameworks for political economy analysis, developed predominantly during the early to mid-2000s (Desai, 2011: 10), sit within the sub-discipline of development economics, and draw heavily on insights from the new institutional economics. They are concerned with   ‘political   incentives,   distribution   of   political   power,   credibility,  institutional fragility, as well as recognition of significant regional and sub-regional variations in the political-economic   landscape’   (Desai,   2011:   10). Thus although the political element of contestation, interests, and power figure prominently, emphasis remains on the economic results of political decisions.  In assemblage theory terms, focusing on political economy analysis is a way of tracking 
the  ‘new’  concern  with  politics  in  anti-corruption and governance policy as it joins with other expressive components to code organisational identity within the World Bank and enables it to perform new tasks. The development of the 2007 GAC Strategy provided the impetus for a more systematic approach to mainstreaming political economy 
analysis  in  the  World  Bank’s  governance  and  anti-corruption work. The new framework draws on the large body of existing work within the Bank, and from a “community of practice” comprised of Bank and affiliated experts and contractors in universities and aid agencies in donor countries (Desai, 2011).   
Conducting political economy analysis  The “political”  has  entered  into  governance  reform  analysis  over  the  years  in  a  number of different frameworks. Early approaches   focused   on   “constraints”   to   economic                                                          4 The key World Bank guides to political economy analysis are The Political Economy of Policy Reform (World Bank, 2008), published by the Social Development Department, the 2009 Problem-Driven 
Governance and Political Economy Analysis (Fritz et al., 2009), published by the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, and the recent Understanding Policy Change: Political Economy Concepts 
in Practice (November 2012) published by the World Bank Institute. The different sections within the Bank responsible for these documents indicate, to some extent, their orientation. The first is focused on ways of identifying potential opportunities for reform within priority sectors (e.g. agriculture and water), the second presupposes a defined problem to which the tools of political economy analysis can be applied across three interlinked levels: country, sector and project; and the third as a handbook for development practitioners, students, teachers, journalists, and civil society actors. 
  47 
development and reform, and included political factors in the analysis, while institutionalist analysis focused on the political and economic institutions in a society and the incentives associated with their persistence (Duncan, 2011). The “new”  political economy analysis tools developed by the World Bank attempt to integrate earlier approaches, and focus on identifying stakeholders, specifying the stakes (gains, losses, incentives and payoffs) involved, the institutional context, the constraints to policy reform, and the structural factors that condition incentives (e.g. natural resource endowments), taking  account  of   “historical   legacies”.  These components are described 
below  to  provide  an   indication  of   the  content  and   inputs  to  the  World  Bank’s  political  economy analysis work. The summary of the approach to political economy analysis outlined below   is   taken,   for   the   most   part,   from   the   World   Bank’s   most   recent  publication in this area, Corduneanu-Huci et al’s Understanding Policy Change: Political 
Economy Concepts in Practice (2012).  
Identifying and mapping stakeholders  Stakeholders are identified as those individuals or organisations that are likely to be 
impacted  by  policy  reform.  Stakeholder  analysis  comprises  two  parts:   ‘an   inventory  or  
mapping  of   the  key  stakeholders,   their  political   influence  and  the  links  between  them’,  and what and how much the key individuals or organisations are likely to win or lose from the reform (Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012: 283). This latter aspect can be difficult to quantify, and can exhibit subjective as well as objective aspects, in so far as stakeholder preferences may not necessarily correspond with their material interests. As Amartya 
Sen  has  suggested  ‘commitment  drives  an  all  important  wedge  between  personal  choice  (preference) and personal welfare (interest)’  (1977:  329;  cited  in  Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012: 284). Therefore it is important that stakeholder analysis include both evidence about the preferences of different stakeholders (derived from, for example, interviews, 
field   work,   and   surveys),   and   ‘objective   values   or   expected   preferences   that   can   be  derived from theory based on the logical possibilities and precedents of preference 
articulation  and  interest  aggregation’  (Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012: 284). Corduneanu-Huci et al suggest that stakeholder analysis should proceed through four steps:  
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policy preferences of stakeholders (their personal choices); interest specification 
(actors’  awareness  of  how  their  preferences  translate  into  personal  welfare);   interest 
articulation (what actors actually want, express and pursue regardless of their capacity to obtain it); interest aggregation (collective action capacities for policy change) (Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012: 285).  Stakeholders are then usually categorised as demand-side or supply-side stakeholders, 
reform  champions  (‘powerful  actors  with  high  stakes in the policy process who facilitate 
collective  action  and  advocate  change’)  or  reform  opponents  (those  who  have  interests  in maintaining the status quo) (Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012: 285). Such categorisation 
is  useful,  but   should   ‘not   lose   sight  of   ambiguity  and  dynamics’   (Fritz  et   al,  2009:  47).  Stakeholders are generally identified in aggregate, but analysis aimed at identifying opportunities for reform will also identify specific actors that may be representative of stakeholder groups. In identifying actors, it is necessary to describe any differences in preferences and interests they may exhibit relative to the aggregate stakeholder 
grouping  they  “represent”.    In determining the preferences and interests of stakeholders, it is necessary to identify the stakes that are in play. Corduneanu-Huci et al provide a typology of gains and losses from policy reform. This typology comprises monetary stakes or payoffs (for example, a new taxpayer registration policy would be likely to impact those who engage in tax 
evasion)   reputational   costs   or  gains   (in  which,   for   example,   a   ‘reform   champion’  wins  acclaim for their efforts and can advance their political or bureaucratic career), and audience costs and gains (commitments lock in expectations for reform, which if not realised can lead to loss of credibility and approval) (2012: 286).  Audience costs and gains depend to a great extent on accountability relations embedded in political systems. Where accountability is weak, both costs and gains can be minimal. In describing the stakes for those impacted by potential reforms, it is also important to account for the time horizon of costs and benefits (the relative value accorded to short and long term 
gains),   stakeholders’   risk   profile,   and   reform   stages (sequencing). This latter aspect is particularly important in anti-corruption reform, as the gap between the policy process stage of reform and subsequent implementation stages (particularly in terms of 
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monitoring and enforcement) is wide and full or opportunities for the policy to breakdown.   Corduneanu-Huci et al suggest that stakeholder analysis can be structured around three key questions: who are the relevant stakeholders (individuals and organisations)? What resources does each stakeholder have (institutional resources, access to influencers, financial resources)? What is the intensity of stakeholder preferences (how significantly would a reform impact preferences and interests)?  
Institutional context  Consistent with the new institutional economics, institutions here refer to the formal 
and   informal  “rules  of   the  game”  that  operate   in  a  policy  making  process.  These  rules,  
which  constitute  the  institutional  context  for  policy  reform,  ‘determine[…] the power of 
different  stakeholders  to  promote  their  agendas’  (Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012: 287). A political economy analysis should describe the institutions relevant to the policy process, and ask questions about slippage between formal and informal rules, who is granted special privileges by which institutions, and how ‘the   incentives  generated  by  the rules of the game affect the collective action potential, resources and reform stakes 
for   stakeholders’   (Corduneanu-Huci   et   al,   2012:   287).   For   Fritz   et   al,   ‘thorough  institutional analysis strengthens the operational usefulness of GPE [governance and political economy analysis] by identifying what reforms are feasible from political 
economy  as  well  as  an  explicitly  institutional  perspective’  (2009:  8).  Key  to  this  can  be  developing an understanding of the relationships between formal and informal institutions. Fritz et al offers a typology of these relationships, suggesting they fall into complementary (in which informal institutions support formal institutions), accommodating (some acceptance of formal institutions, accompanied with some circumvention), substituting (in which informal institutions   ‘fill   a   void   that   is   left   by  
missing   or   incomplete   formal   institutions’),   and   competing   or subverting (where informal institutions  ‘diverge  from,  contradict,  or  contravene  formal  institutions’) forms (2009: 45).    
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Constraints  The key constraints on reform are identified as principal-agent problems, information asymmetries, and lack of credible commitment. Constraints are significant where they impact the potential for collective action. Identifying domains for collective action (e.g. political parties, unions and social movements), and the nature of collective action problems will reveal something of the constraints to collective action in particular situations. This requires attention to the efficiency of information exchange between stakeholders, the prospects of establishing reliable principal-agent relations (e.g. between reform champions and implementers), the monitoring and evaluation arrangements that could be brought to bear on the reform, and the mechanisms that could be used to enhance the likelihood of credible commitment. Understanding constraints as they arise from the institutional context and the disposition of stakeholders is important to assessing the feasibility of reform (Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012).  
Structural variables  Fritz et al. and others (e.g. DFID, 2009) argue for the specific inclusion of structural variables in political economy analysis. The natural resource base, level of development, climate, geography, and population dynamics can have a deep influence on the incentives and constraints available to stakeholders, and the historical roots of 
institutions.  As  Fritz  et   al  notes,   ‘the  nature  of   resource  endowments   can   significantly  
shape  the  development  and  institutional  trajectory  of  countries’  (Fritz  et  al,  2009:  42).    
Methods  Social science research instruments are key inputs to political economy analysis. Surveys, case studies, interviews, media analysis, and qualitative analyses are required to provide a wide base of data for both the descriptive (the what?) and inferential (the 
why?) aspects of the political economy analysis. Accounting for systematic bias in 
sources   requires   the   “triangulation”   of   evidence,   which   can   take   place,   for   example,  within data collection instruments (e.g. careful attention in formulating and asking 
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survey questions) and by using a number of sources covering the same event (e.g. media reports, interview responses, transcripts of parliamentary debates) (Fritz et al, 2009; Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012).  
Timing  Political economy analysis can also provide insight into the timing of reforms, by indicating the kinds of conditions conducive to reform. This can include the identification of the kinds of critical junctures5 that could facilitate reform, along with less dramatic timing structures, like election cycles, shifts in public opinion, changes to 
the  economic   context   (commodity  prices),   the  development  of  new   international   ‘best  
practice’  standards  and  recommendations,  and   international  relations  (e.g.  geopolitical  considerations in aid funding). Consideration of the pacing of reform is also a key to the effective timing of policy reform. As noted above, different stakeholder dynamics may be in play at different stages of the reform process.  Reform champions may secure a reputational windfall for seeing a new bill through the legislature, but effectively abandon responsibility for it during the crucial implementation stage. Pacing takes into account the spread of incentives at different stages of the reform process, so that the different collective action problems that arise can (at least) be anticipated and included in assessments of reform feasibility. It can drive the use of wider consultative mechanisms, for example, or long-term relationship building with media to encourage ongoing interest in and visibility of the   reform   process.   In   this   respect,   ‘the   right  sequencing of reform steps can build-in short-term political gains that broaden 
acceptance  and  pave  the  way  for  subsequent  stages’  (Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012: 310).  
Organisational  “buy-in”  The major guides on political economy analysis point out that just as political and economic processes are   interdependent   and   subject   to   constant   changes,   so   ‘political  
economy   analysis   should   be   viewed   as   a   dynamic   process   rather   than   a   static   output’  (DFID, 2009: 20). Analyses should therefore be subject to revision and integrated                                                         5 According to Corduneanu-Huci  et  al,  ‘unprecedented  episodes of catalytic events that lead to the 
realignment  of  incentives  and  lift  preexistent  constraints  on  action’  (Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012: 304). 
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directly into the work of operational teams. As with any operational input, there are organisational and mirco-political considerations to the development and implementation of political economy analyses. In order to win support for such work, practitioners must clearly identify the purpose of the analysis, ensure the timing is right to feed into strategy or project development, identify the audience(s) of the analysis taking account of tensions that could emerge (including trade-offs between transparency and rigour of analysis), specify data collection methodologies including who the analyst proposes to work with to ensure the most useful inputs, and how the analysis will be disseminated within and beyond the organisation (DFID, 2009). These considerations all impact on the scope and depth of the analysis, and so require careful attention prior to putting proposals forward to organisational sponsors.  
Assessing political economy analysis  Desai carried out a review of 200 World Bank projects approved between 2004 and 
2010  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  political  economy  analyses  had  been  “mainstreamed”  in World Bank operations. The review covered a range of analyses that included political elements, as well as specific political economy analyses, and found   that   ‘the   use   of  formal and informal political-institutional analysis in projects is high, and has not changed significantly between pre-GAC and post-GAC   periods’   (Desai,   2011:   41).   The  majority of the projects reviewed included both formal and informal rules,  but  the  ‘most  common analytical tool is of formal institutions, with 80-90 percent of projects 
incorporating   this   tool’.   However, the review found that specific political economy analyses were used in only a small number of projects, although given the small numbers the increase between the pre-GAC and post-GAC was relatively significant (Desai, 2011: 42).  The key conclusions from the  review  were  that   ‘political  analysis  was  and  is  thinly  and  
inconsistently  applied’,   ‘the  rigor  and  quality  of  political  analysis  was  …  uneven,  partly  
as  a  result  of  a  lack  of  a  common  definition  of  what  constituted  “political  economy”’,  and  
‘more   sophistication is needed in the design of instruments and tools used in World Bank-supported programs, taking into account both the political constraints in 
countries,  sectors  and  projects,  as  well  as  the  possible  unintended  consequences’  (Desai,  
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2011: 48). This reflects   a   concern   that   ‘the   gap   between   political-economic diagnosis 
and  operational  solutions  will  continue  to  widen’,  and  ‘it  will  require  highly  innovative  solutions to operational problems given these political constraints solutions which, thus far, have   not   been   widely   forthcoming’   (Desai,   2011:   48).   In   terms   of  
“mainstreaming”  political  economy  analysis,  the  review  suggests  that   ‘the  development  
of  a   separate  analytical  product   line  …  purely  devoted  to  political-economy analysis is unlikely to lead to  significant  “mainstreaming”  of  political  analysis   in  Bank  operations’  (Desai, 2011: 48). However, incremental funding of political economy analysis inputs into country and sector work has increased   since   2000   and   ‘high   quality   “embedded”  forms of political analysis often carried a great deal of weight, impact, and value-added 
in   Bank   operations’   (Desai,   2011:   48).   The   Political   Economy   Community   of   Practice  
developed   within   the   Bank   comprises   a   ‘roster   of   in-house   experts   and   …   a   similar  roster of consultants with the requisite skills and knowledge of the politics of countries 
and   sectors’   (Desai,   2011:   48).   However,   a   survey   of   Bank   staff   indicated   that   ‘most  respondents did not believe that political-economic guidance and support had been provided in a user-friendly  way’  (Desai,  2011:  49).    
The  review  also  noted  that  ‘although  political  economic  analyses  …  expanded  the  Bank’s  knowledge of political and institutional constraints to project outcomes, most analyses proposed solutions closely related to those elaborated in the 2000 governance strategy, or the PRSP Sourcebook, focusing on inclusive policy making, the need for checks and 
balances   on   executive   authority,   and   transparent   decision   making’   (Desai,   2011:   49).  
The   ‘highly   conventional’   nature   of   recommendations arising from political economic 
analyses,  also  did  not  take  account  of  the  World  Bank’s  ‘own  role  or  that  of  other  donors  
in   shaping   incentives   in   sectors   and   countries’   (Desai,   2011:   49).   This evaluation suggests that there is scope for improving the way the World Bank approaches political economy analysis in its reform agendas. The next chapter proposes that the insights from complexity science and assemblage theory could have a role in improving political 
economy  analysis  as  a  “thinking  tool”.   
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Chapter Five 
 Improving political economy analysis: a role for assemblage theory?   Political economy analysis is used to identify potential reform action, and to help understand how reforms might be progressed. This chapter begins with a critique of an influential case study of an anti-corruption and governance reform process to show that although political economy analysis offers the prospect of a broad understanding of the political, economic and social dynamics in a reform situation, it remains preoccupied with formal institutional fixes that obscure the role of informality in social relations, and may limit the scope for political contestation.  The relationship between the formal and informal is then used as a gateway to explore how assemblage theory offers ways to improve political economy analysis, not by way of a wholesale renovation, but by 
suggesting   how   “assemblage   thinking”  might   reveal ways of addressing corruption in specific contexts.  
Collective action and social accountability: Procurement reform in the Philippines  Perhaps the central theme of the political turn in anti-corruption and governance discourse is the importance of collective action to the instigation of governance reform (Corduneanu-Huci et al, 2012). However, the kind of collective action imagined in World Bank political economy analysis is the very deliberate construction of reform coalitions. While this is by no means an easy process, it is different to the kinds of collective action observable in social movements. An influential example of the formation of this kind of deliberate or engineered collective action is the development of a coalition to advance procurement reform in the Philippines. Government procurement is an area of significant corruption risks, because it involves large sums and long-term contracts, and affects social services and infrastructure critical for development. The greater the discretion of officials, both elected and unelected, in procurement decision making, the greater the opportunity for corruption. While competitive tendering is the classic model for procurement, formal and informal processes that exclude potential providers can undermine competition. Lack of evaluation and monitoring of delivery of procured 
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goods and services also increases effective discretion and incentives for personal gain. The Philippines Procurement Reform Act (PRA) story has been influential in recent development practice because it outlines the kinds of sensitive political dynamics inherent in governance reform, and suggests roles that international organisations and donors can play in these dynamics. In particular, it has influenced the promotion and funding by the World Bank of social accountability initiatives (World Bank, 2011a). Social accountability, according to the World Bank, involves citizens and civil society 
groups   ‘monitoring and assessing government performance—particularly in providing feedback on, and voicing demand for, improved service delivery—and thus contributing to greater development effectiveness’   (2012:   iii). Promoting social accountability involves the development of civil society capability to monitor and voice concerns about governance. From a governance reform perspective, it involves, on the one hand, promulgation of formal rules and procedures, and on the other, the participation of 
citizens’  groups  to  monitor   the adherence of officials to those rules. A summary of the PRA story is included as a case study in an appendix to  Corduneanu-Huci et al’s 
Understanding Policy Change: Political Economy Concepts in Practice, the only case study included in this way. Given the influence of the Philippines PRA case study in informing both the practice of political economy analysis, and the promotion of social accountability in policy and rhetoric, it is examined below from critical and assemblage theory perspectives.   The PRA case study was originally prepared following the successful passing of the 
Procurement   Reform   Act   and   was   intended   to   provide   ‘practical   lessons   on   strategy,  which by its very nature is about dealing with political barriers or problems as they crop 
up  during  the  implementation  process’  of  a  policy  reform  (Campos  and  Syquia,  2006:  3).  Developing and securing political agreement to legislation is not an easy project to undertake. As Campos and Syquia point out:   
…for  a  procurement  code  to  be  passed,  four  potential  impediments  had  to  be  overcome. First, the Executive branch had to be unified in the effort. Second, civil society groups had to be mobilized to lead the advocacy needed to get the legislature to act. Third, the reformers within the Executive branch and civil society groups had to work together in unison. Fourth, influential legislators 
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had to be recruited to champion the bill in their respective chambers (2006: 5).  Collective action in this context succeeded through two main stages: first, ownership of 
and   “buy-in”   to the reform process by key government organisations, and second, promoting and coordinating civil society pressure for reform. The World Bank and US Agency for International Development (USAID) played enabling roles in the process, but it was initiated and to a great extent led by Filipino civil servants, notably, in 1998, by the head of Philippines Department of Budget and Management (DBM), Benjamin 
Diokno,   ‘a  US-trained economist with a  background  in  public   administration’   (Campos  and Syquia, 2006: 8). Diokno sought assistance from USAID to develop an analysis of the problems with public procurement in the Philippines and a draft procurement bill that could consolidate the many existing instruments that structured procurement processes. Although the analysis was done to a tight timeline, and the work produced was of high analytically quality, the DBM Undersecretary with responsibility for it 
quietly  shelved  the  analysis  and  ‘became  reticent about moving things beyond internal 
discussions   with   the   consultants’.   This   was   because   the   consultants   had   ‘alienated  practically every government official they had interviewed and/or to whom they 
presented   earlier   drafts   of   the   study’   (Campos   and   Syquia, 2006: 8). The way the 
consultants   worked   clashed   dramatically   with   the   ‘painstaking   ownership   building’  
necessary   for   ‘buy-in’   within   Philippines   civil   service   agencies   (Campos   and   Syquia,  2006: 8).  Within the context of a wider budget reform program, a technical assistance team comprising staff from USAID and the World Bank sought to understand why the procurement reform work had been shelved. They organised a two day workshop on the analysis and draft bill developed by the USAID consultants, which was pitched as a 
session  in  which  officials  could  ‘“shoot  down”  the  consultants’  study  section  by  section,  
line  by  line,  and  then  develop  their  own  version  of  the  procurement  law’  (Campos  and  Synquia, 2006: 9). This was a very successful process, which led to the kind cross-agency ownership necessary to engender executive branch support for the reform process, and led to the formation of a cross-departmental technical work group. The working group remained in place for the duration of the legislative process, and was crucial for securing 
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the ongoing support from government agencies for the procurement reform, even as it hit snags along the way. Support across government departments was also important for providing confidence to senior officials and politicians that the bill was technically sound, and could achieve what was intended. In this context, the bill, with the collective support of officials across the executive branch of government, was attractive to the President (Joseph Estrada, at that time embroiled in a corruption scandal) who provided for its expeditious introduction to the legislature for consideration.   This first phase faltered when the progress of the Bill through the legislature was overtaken by the political upheaval associated with Estrada’s   impeachment   in   2001.  When the new president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took office she did so on a strong anti-corruption platform as politicians across the spectrum sought to differentiate themselves from the scandals of the previous administration.  This held out good prospects for the procurement reform, but only if public pressure for anti-corruption policies continued. The second phase therefore involved the formation of a civil society coalition to call for and support the reform process. The case study provides details on the steps taken by the technical advisors and key officials to win support from individual politicians, and illustrates the importance of personal integrity and reputation in the relationships between key players. Understanding this landscape is essential for the close management necessary to win and keep support for a reform process in a highly charged political environment. Through this time, while the technical assistance team and the officials working group had become together a  ‘tightly  knit,  well  oiled  machine’,  
they  ‘deliberated  on  the  need  for  an  NGO  to  monitor  the  implementation  of  the  new  law  
if  it  was  passed’  (Campos  and  Syquia,  2006:  16).  The  result  was  the  formation  in  2001  of  a new non-government organisation, Procurement Watch Inc. (PWI), with members of the technical assistance team on its board alongside academics with an interest in corruption control and governance reform. PWI had a crucial role in the second phase of the reform process by coordinating the involvement of a wider grouping of civil society 
organisations.      PWI   was   established   to   ‘recreate   a   semblance   of   the   impeachment  
ambience   that   could   focus   the   public’s   attention   on   corruption,   at   least   to   an   extent  sufficient to convince enough legislators to support  the  needed  legislation’  (Campos  and  Syquia, 2006: 16). What is most interesting about this process is the central involvement of technical assistance staff from the World Bank in PWI and the civil society and media 
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aspects of the reform process. PWI sought and secured funding from donors (including the World Bank) for advertising and promotion, engaging a marketing firm to develop a campaign strategy with AM radio programming as a key tactic.  Politicians from across the political spectrum were invited onto AM talk shows to answer questions about the PRA and its implications. Securing support from a range of political parties allowed the PRA to become a non-partisan issue, with politicians lining up to demonstrate their support for its anti-corruption message. The PRA was passed by Congress in 2003 with a large majority.   While the PRA case study provides useful insight into potential strategies for engaging in and with the politics of formal institutional reforms, it does not extend to the implementation of those reforms. In a recent paper, Rodan and Hughes have described how the PRA implementation has been much less successful in terms of achieving efficient and transparent government procurement than would be implied in the success story outlined in the case study and its use by the World Bank and other agencies to inform subsequent governance strategies (2012). Once the PRA was passed, the pro-
poor   rhetoric   deployed   during   the   policy   reform   process   shifted   ‘to   the   technical  concern of monitoring compliance  with  detailed  and  complex  regulations  and  processes’  (Rodan and Hughes, 2012: 372). The civil society-state partnership model instilled in the PRA required the involvement of civil society groups on the Bids and Awards Committees (BACs) that make public procurement decisions. This was an important 
element   of   the   reform   process,   and   was   seen   as   a   “win”   for   civil   society   groups.  However, in the implementation process it became clear that the extent of procurement activity requires considerable time and resource from civil society groups to participate in BACs and monitor the implementation of the PRA. Rodan and Hughes write that although ‘the   roles   of   BAC   observers   and   recourse   to   PTG   [the Procurement Transparency Group] have produced some significant instances of arresting corruption 
…   the   challenges   of   ensuring   adequate   numbers   of   observers   sufficiently   equipped  technically to serve on the BACs, let alone lodge reports on concerns about the 
procurement   process,   are   considerable’.   This   means that   the   ‘practical   demands’   of  
participating  in  public  procurement  processes  ‘consume  a  disproportionate  civil  society  
effort  in  technical  rather  than  political  exercises’  (Rodan  and  Hughes,  2012:  374).  
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The  World  Bank’s  experience  with  the  PRA  process  in  the  Philippines,  and particularly its mobilisation of civil society groups, has informed the development of its Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA). The GPSA is a multi-donor fund of which $5 million is provided by the World Bank for supporting civil society organisations engaged in monitoring government service delivery and governance, that is, 
organisations  that  are  ‘working with their governments to achieve greater transparency and accountability,   and   stronger   development   results’   (World   Bank,   2012:   1).  Independent budget analysis (tracking spending relative to budget undertakings), and 
“citizens   report   cards” on health, education, housing and telecommunications are examples of the kinds of approaches that civil society organisations can take to working with governments. The use of mobile communication technology and the Internet are also hailed as offering unprecedented scope for connecting organisations and citizens in collective action efforts to hold politicians and governments accountability for their promises. The two-pronged approach represented by the Philippines PRA example forms the model for social accountability policies: the promulgation of formal rules, followed by the monitoring of those rules by citizens.   The kind of civil society envisaged in efforts to promote social accountability is central 
to   Michel   Foucault’s   idea   of   governmentality, which ‘brings   together   the   practice   of  governing and the necessary rationality of government that makes governing possible’ (Joseph, 2010: 223). This rationality is focused on the management population for, in Le Perrière’s  words,  ‘the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient 
end’ (Foucault, 2001: 210). The rationality necessary for this governmentality might 
also  be  described  as  a  set  of  ‘initial  conditions’  including  a  common  ‘conceptual  map’  of  the political community which members of that community can use to ‘shape   their  
dealings  with  one  another’  (Khilnani,  2001:  27).  It  also  presupposes  ‘a  particular  type  of  self: one that is mutable, able to conceive of interests as transient, and able to change 
and   to   choose   political   loyalties   and   public   affiliations’   (Khilnani,   2001:   28),   and   ‘an  institutional dispersal of   social  power’   (Khilnani,  2001:  30).  Yet   for  many  postcolonial  
and  developing  countries  these  “initial  conditions” are  patchy  at  best.  The  World  Bank’s  social accountability initiatives can be seen an attempt to inculcate this governmental rationality in a  particular   form  of  “partnering”  civil  society.      In   this  respect,   the  World  
Bank’s  social  accountability   initiative   is  designed  as  a   ‘less confrontational approach to 
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making  demands’   in  processes  of   social   change  characterised   ‘not  by   shouting,  but  by  counting’  (Rodan  and  Hughes,  2012:  368).    
Larners   and   Le   Heron   suggest,   ‘political   discourses   only   become   governmental   to   the  
extent   that   they   become   technical’   (Larners   and   Le   Heron,   2004:   213). So while the political is being rehabilitated into anti-corruption discourse through political economy analysis and wider recognition of the political roots of economic institutions, this new concern with politics can also be read as a process of transmuting the political into the governmental. As in the PRA example, politics becomes a way of achieving governmentality.  And thus government comes   to   resemble   ‘a   “managerial   activity”,  
arranging   things  wisely   in   order   to  maximize   outputs   in   specific   fields   of   application’  (Zanotti, 2005: 463). With this governmentality frame, Foucault was able to describe the state as ‘nothing  more  than  the  mobile  effect  of  a  regime  of  multiple  governmentalities’  (Foucault, 2004: 79). This   “belittling”   of   the   monolithic   state   is   also   a   characteristic  move in assemblage theory focusing as it does on undoing totalising conceptions like the 
“state”  and  “society”.  This  manoeuvre  can  also  be  applied  to  “civil  society”,  in  so  far  as  it  questions whether   “civil   society”   is   an   ontological   category,   or   a   short   hand   for   a  population of assemblages (such as social networks) that enter into relations of exteriority with other social entities, such as hierarchical authority structures. If the latter, then the question is what specific assemblages are formed through these relations? What are their properties? What effects are caused by the exercise of their capacities? Some of these assemblages will exhibit properties of governmentality, but not all of them will, and so the patchiness re-enters conceptual models. This is important in terms of both rhetoric and policy because in many countries the existence of authoritarian governments throws civil society organisations into oppositional stances. So while ‘partnership is the DNA   of   the   GPSA’   (World   Bank,   2012:   1),   a vision of 
partnership  is  problematic  because,  as  Khilnani  argues,  in  many  countries  ‘“civil  society”  has come almost exclusively to mean all those forces and agencies which oppose the state and its efforts at   regulation’   (2001:   30).  With   a  model   informed   by   assemblage  theory the context can re-emerge with force. The specific assemblages, their properties and relations of exteriority between them that condition their capacities must be mapped. Only then can an  assessment  be  made  as  to  whether  a  “partnership”  is  feasible  or even desirable. So while the social accountability model, as exemplified in the 
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Philippines PRA case study, may be relevant in particular situations, the oppositional nature of state-civil society relations in many contexts will make social accountability as a project at least problematic in political terms, and at worst it could drain resources and legitimacy from both civil society organisations and those international organisations that support them.  
Thinking with assemblage theory  
Evaluations  of  political  economy  analyses  have  largely  relied  on  ‘the  direct  experience  of  
practitioners’,  and  have reaffirmed  ‘the  potential  of  PEA  [political  economy  analysis]  to  inject greater realism into practice through more open discussion of power, political culture, ethnic divisions, corruption, capacity and incentives, sources of opposition and 
indifference,   and   so   on’   (Copestake   and  Williams,   2012:   2).  However,   there   has   ‘been  little analysis of the politics   of   the   production   of   PEA   [political   economy   analyses]’  (Copestake and Williams, 2012: 5). To this end, Copestake and Williams suggest that 
more  effective  political  economy  analysis  can  be  improved  by  being  ‘more  specific about the scope of analysis,  who  it  is  being  done  for  and  why;  …  more  reflexive by combining a political economy analysis with more explicit self-assessment;  …  more  agile by adapting 
analysis  and  its  use  to  feedback  and  new  events’  (Copestake  and  Williams,  2012:  3).  This  comes down to greater elaboration of the position of the analysts and commissioning organisation with respect to incentives, constraints and institutional factors, and their ability to influence change. The authors suggest that one way of doing this would be to apply some of the insights from complexity science to political economy analysis, particularly feedback, non-linear causality, and co-evolution. However, as argued above, before concepts from complexity science can used in social explanation, it is necessary to ensure that this borrowing is sensitive to the philosophical and theoretical implications of those concepts.  One of the key insights from complexity science is the time irreversibility of many non-classical physical systems and thus their dependence on historical processes.  Political economy analysis can be powerful because it is sensitive to the historical roots of current political and economic institutional arrangements, and because in bringing political processes within the scope of analysis it can track across the whole social 
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terrain,   instead   of   being   focused   on   issues   that   are   narrowly   “economic”.   However,  
although   ‘[m]ost   political   economy   frameworks   used   by   donors   highlight   these   issues  
[related  to  history  and  context]  …  the  implications  for  development policy are often not 
pursued’   (Institute of Development Studies, 2010: 72). While the rational-legal organisational form, and the expertise it fosters, imposes limits on the tasks that are seen as legitimate to international development organisations (associated, for example, with emphases on objective detachment and neutrality), it can also condition the attitude and imaginary that practitioners bring to the construction of development problems and tasks. The Institute of Development Studies suggests that policy makers 
need   to   ‘resist   the   temptation   to   revert   to   the   default   position   of   viewing   the   world  
through  an  OECD  lens’  (2010:  78).  This  requires an  acknowledgement  that  ‘the  current  global environment is quite different from the one in which Western state building took place, creating a new and historically unprecedented set of challenges, which have until 
recently  been  neglected  by  donors’  (Institute of Development Studies, 2010: 72).   It is simply not possible to engineer the emergence of OECD-style institutional organisations in many countries. Institutions emerge from the immediate political 
economy  environment.  As  the  children’s  rhyme  would  have  it,  “all  the  king’s  horses  and  
all   the   king’s   men”,   despite   their   best   efforts,   cannot   artificially create an emergent entity against the arrow of time. The   “political   turn”   in anti-corruption discourse is a reaction to this, and while political economy analysis can make practitioners sensitive to the specific context of their work, the positivist framework in which this analysis takes place does not provide for the kind of interactive model that the Institute of Development Studies and others suggest. Positivist social theories, like neo-classical economics, are implicated in fixing the positions of observer and observed. The kind of 
“upside-down” approaches being promoted by the Institute of Development Studies, Copestake and Williams, and others are thus undermined by the effect that positivist social science has on reinforcing the status of the observer the emphasis on the 
“diagnostic”   role   assigned   to   political   economy   analysis,   for instance, expresses an expert detachment and the prospect of treatment.  This does not mean that in practice organisations like the World Bank do not learn from their development partners, and do not themselves change in their interactions to be able to better position themselves to participate in the production of social knowledge and policy the   discourse   on   “open  
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development”   and   the   fierce   surveillance   of   internal governance processes are examples but   it   effaces   donors’   participation   as   components   of   assemblages   in   the  context of development. The production and circulation of knowledge on corruption and governance, therefore, is subject to a disjunction between the scientific aura of that knowledge, on the one hand, and, on the other, the lack of coherence in that knowledge when viewed from the perspective of a realist philosophy of science.   This can lead to problems, including problems in relation to ideology that are also picked up at the empirical level in the new institutional economics, for example, in the preference for either state or market as solutions to low economic growth. De Janvry 
and   Dethier,   for   instance   suggest   that   one   of   the   difficulties   with   “mainstreaming”  political economy analysis may also be a symptom of a split among Bank leadership and membership about the role of the state in development between those who see the 
state’s   role   as   limited   to   addressing   market   failure,   and   those   that   also   see it as a 
‘proactive  coordinating  instrument’  (De  Janvry  and  Dethier,  2012:  29).  They  suggest  that  
‘Bank   leadership  has  almost  always   looked  at  the  role  of  state  as  a  divisive   issue  to  be  
carefully  handled,  in  part  by  neglecting  it’  (De  Janvy  and  Dethier, 2012: 29). The authors 
argue  that  this  has  led  to  an  ‘underinvestment  (relative  to  effective  demand  and  project  
needs)  in  World  Bank  staff  skills  on  governance  matters’  (De  Janvry  and  Dethier,  2012:  30).   One of the main purposes for DeLanda in pursuing assemblage theory is to guard against 
the  reification  of  totalities  and  essences  in  social  explanation.  “Society”,  “the  state”,  and  
“culture”  are   the  kinds  of   irreal   entities  assumed  by  many   social   theories.  Often   these  words are used as short hand for complex organisational arrangements, but there are few satisfying explanations in positivist theory that link the micro activities of obvious 
persons  and  organisations  with   the   totality   represented  by   terms   like   “society”.   Social  assemblages on the other hand overlap: they share many of the same components (for example, the same persons), they can merge, be symbiotic, or parasitic. Assemblages can form within an existing assemblage, changing it radically, or splitting from it impacting its resource dependencies. They are all interacting entities in a flat ontology, more or less territorialised and coded. A hierarchical organisation may imply superiority, but that is relative to an exercise of its properties in relations of exteriority (e.g. the 
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legitimate use of violence or   practices   “governmentality”) and not to ontological superiority. This creates the space for contestation, a space that is denied in totalities where change requires a transformation of the identity of the totality itself.  As DeLanda states:  One difference between the neoinstitutionalist approach and the one I am trying to sketch here is this: beyond the level of the individual organisation, the neoinstitutionalist does not seem to envision yet another emergent larger scale entity but simply refers  to  “society”  or  “the  polity”  as  a  whole.  This,  however  runs  the  risk  of  introducing too much homogeneity into our models and of suggesting that human 
societies   form   a   “totality”,   that   is,   an   entity   on   a   higher   ontological   plane   than  individual institutions and individual human beings. By contrast, speaking of concrete 
cities   (instead   of   “society”   in   the   abstract)   enables   us   to   include   in   our   models  historically emergent wholes that do not form totalities but simply larger scale individual entities (DeLanda, 1997: 37; cited in Deuchars, 2010: 175-6).  Many of the problems encountered in work to improve economic governance involve a central problematic in terms of relationships between parts and wholes. For example, corruption in public procurement may involve problems with a lack organisation and coordination of information across different civil service organisations. However, the causes for the persistence of that lack of organisation and coordination may lie at different levels of organisations. This means that intervening at one level to establish a formal law or set of procedures may not have an impact on persistent informal processes that adapt to the alterations in the formal environment.   The Institute of Development Studies argues that   ‘[d]evelopment practitioners, and especially Western donors, have mental models of development and of their own role in 
the  process  that  get  in  the  way  of  accepting  and  applying  research  findings’  (Institute  of  Development Studies, 2010: 69). These mental models inscribe a tendency to focus on formal institutions and organisations, to reject best practice as impossible but yearn for it out of familiarity and pride, and to forget that, despite their expertise, international organisations can never be auteurs of development. The main contributions that assemblage theory can make are to counter these tendencies in thought, and to use the 
opportunity   provided   by   the   ‘new’   concern   with   the   political   in anti-corruption 
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discourse represented and encapsulated by political economy analysis to provide openings for new ways of thinking about the context of governance reforms and anti-corruption projects. Assemblage theory can contribute in four principal ways by: (1) clarifying the   ontological   status   of   ‘institutions’,   (2)   emphasising to practitioners the reality of informality, (3) providing an historically sensitive vocabulary to loosen the bonds of “best practice”, and (4) providing reasons for reflexivity. These four contributions are discussed below.  
(1) Clarifying the ontological status of institutions  One of the key features of the new institutional economics is its separation of ‘the 
underlying   rules   from   the   strategy   of   the   players’   (North,   1990:   5). While this is principally an analytical move, it has ontological implications in the reification of methodological individualism it produces. North suggests that institutions influence the mental models that individuals apply to choice situations conditioned by the rules at play, and that this is the pathway through which the methodological individualism of neoclassical economics is reconciled with the constraints on choice sets and interest identification represented by social institutions (North, 1990). However, assemblage theory would suggest that individual persons are components in larger scale assemblages in which rules play territorialising and coding functions. The predominant strategies of players, then, would figure as processes of (de)territorialisation in the larger scale assemblage. The rules and the strategies of the players are reintegrated in an assemblage, which becomes a legitimate object of analysis. This would allow consideration of, for example, a public procurement system as, not complexes of rules balancing incentives for self-interested actors, but assemblages, in which rules enter into relations of exteriority with a range of heterogenous components. Singular interventions, like the promulgation of a new law, could not ever be the end point of reform. Such interventions should be seen in relation to ongoing de- and re-territorialising processes.   Institutional change, then, proceeds by processes of de- and re-territorialisation, which may be associated with changes in formal rules (such as a new law that opens up a monopoly to competition) or more informal process, like the effects of technological 
  66 
change on the economic opportunities of social actors (for example, mobile phone banking). Identifying and mapping assemblages, and tracking (de)territorialising processes is a legitimate expert task for international organisations.   
(2) Emphasising the reality of informality  While the political economy analysis guides urge analysts to map informal institutions, the tendency to focus on formal institutions betrays a positivist (but also perhaps a practical) bias toward written codes and immediately apprehensible rules and social entities. In  his  exploration  of  informal  urbanism,  Kim  Dovey,  suggests  that  ‘the  informal  and formal sectors are not separate, both are always present with reciprocal relations in 
all  economies’  (Dovey,  2012: 350). He goes on to say:  These forms of urban informality are fundamentally integrated with an informal economy and informal politics. Informal controls are imposed over informal practices: informal fines, fees and bribes are paid, votes are bought, blind eyes are turned. Informal houses, shops and factories are built and inhabited by informal residents and staff. Informal land tenure and home ownership systems evolve, informal rents are paid, informal electricity and water is tapped. Informal governance operates within the framework of formal governance (Dovey, 2012: 352).  As such, informal and formal organisations are assembled together in shared spaces: 
‘while   an   informal   settlement   can   be   identified   and   territorialised   as   a   discrete  assemblage (as a noun), it is assembled (as a verb) through its multi-scale connections 
with  the  political  economy  of  the  city,  nation  and  globe’  (Dovey,  2012:  358).  Therefore,  
the  formal  and  informal  should  be  seen  as  a  ‘two-fold concept rather than two concepts 
in   opposition’   (Dovey,   2012:   363).   While   political   economy analysis certainly makes room for informal institutions, the emphasis is in recommendations tends to be placed on strengthening formal institutions. However, as the Institute of Development Studies 
point   out   ‘there   is   mounting   evidence   that   many   reforms to improve governance by strengthening formal, rules-based   institutions   have   had   limited   impacts’   (2010:   69).  Reforms that focus on formal institutional changes may, in a context populated by assemblages of formal and informal social organisations, only lead to the adaptations of 
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those assemblages to changed conditions, pursuing the same ends rather than the improved outcomes sought by reformers.   
The   “formal” here refers to institutional organisations and rules that are based on written laws, procedures and constitutions, administered by governmental organisations recognised at the international level in discourses of sovereignty.  However, some of the micro-components of a governmental macro-assemblage will be 
components  of  other  “informal”  assemblages,  such as political patronage networks. The sharing of components by different assemblages is important: the same individual persons can be members of different networks exercising different capacities in each. In this sense, systemic corruption appears where the resources that form part of an assemblage are appropriated into another. The sharing of components by two or more assemblages has (de)territorialising effects on those assemblages. The relationship between these overlaid assemblages is familiar from the typology of formal-informal institutional relations outlined in the guides to political economy analysis. In line with this institutional analysis, the overlaid assemblages can be complementary, accommodating, substituting, or competing or subverting (Fritz et al, 2009). However, the additional force to thought that assemblage theory provides is the imperative to specify the concrete components of the overlaid assemblages. While empirically difficult, this guards against conceiving of institutional conflict as a result of tensions between, for 
example,   “traditional   values”   and   administrative   “best   practice”.   To   map   social  assemblages is to ask how they provide resources and constraints to their component parts within the specific environmental context.   The focus on corruption here might suggest that informality is a problem. However, informality per se should certainly not be equated with criminality, inefficiency or corruption. The efficiency of many organisations derives from the informality of interpersonal networks in which the ‘little ideas of little men, the little inventions and interferences between imitative currents’  (Deleuze  1994: 314) enable the production of socially useful products. Increasingly, businesses are creating workspaces designed to encourage informal interactions. In addition, informal processes and networks also place constraints on the kinds of behaviours implicated in corruption by acting as reputation storage devices (DeLanda, 2006:56). However, whether reputation storage is 
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an emergent property of a social network is an empirical question, one that should be investigated in trying to identify novel ways of controlling corruption. Political economy analysis should therefore ask whether formal rules and procedures support the kind of creative informality key to collective action, or might disrupt it leading to a more pernicious informality-formality relation.   
(3) Loosening  the  bonds  of  ‘best  practice’  DeLanda suggests that the main implication assemblage theory has for policy and practice is experimentation and the search for new organisational forms. DeLanda’s  imperative to experimentation is not to be read as a licence to impose experimental conditions on development loans, or effect radical or absolute deterritorialisations of assemblages,   but   a   ‘call   for   a   more   experimental   attitude   toward   reality   and   the  potential for self-organisation inherent in even the humblest forms of matter-energy’  (DeLanda, 1997: 273). Deleuze and Guattari sum up this attitude when they suggest:  This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum [in  DeLanda’s  term, a particularly durable assemblage], experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 178).  This kind of experimentation is underpinned in assemblage theory by the relationship between the virtual and actual. The universal singularities briefly described in chapter one are historically contingent,  and  as  such  the  “diagram” of authority structure drawn from Weber reflects the historical development of authority structures, predominantly in the West. However singularities, actual assemblages, evolve in co-adaptation with their environments in complexity  terms,  in  relation  to  “fitness landscapes”6 so there can be no pre-determined “best practice” model that can be transplanted to a different context. An authority structure can only change along the dimensions structuring the possibility space, and does so through processes of (de)territorialisation and (de)coding.                                                         6 ‘Fitness  landscape’  refers  to  the  dynamic  adaptive  interactions  between  entities  in  a  specific  environment.  It  should  not  be  confused  with  competitive  social  Darwinian  “survival  of  the  fittest”. 
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It is not possible to predict how this change will occur as the singularity moves into the adjacent possible, but as social assemblages affect their component parts and adapt to their environments (including other entities) they change the interactions of those parts, which can in turn lead to changes in the whole, particularly at critical points, pushing the assemblage into a “phase change” situation radical change from one tendency to another, or one set of universal singularities to another. The diagram as virtual is mechanism independent, it requires mechanisms to be actualised, but the mechanisms are not pre-given, that is, the movement from one attractor one universal singularity to another in the possibility space can take any number of novel tracks depending on the exercise of the capacities of the entities that make up the assemblage (in interaction with each other and the environment). This is a critique   of   the   “path  
dependence”   central   to   neo-institutionalism.   While,   the   “lock   in”   aspect of path dependence the acknowledgement that organisations only change relative to their properties from one moment to the next is consistent with the insights from complexity science and assemblage theory, path dependence itself is often used to suggest pre-formed (or  even  “essential”)  alternative paths, and the difficulty inherent in switching from one to the other. The concept of possibility space, on the other hand, suggests a much more open trajectory of change, one that unfolds in interactions with a landscape of other social entities and environmental factors. This evolutionary approach suggests there is a process of blind “discovery”   of   organisational   forms.   The   rational-legal form of authority structure, for instance, is relatively young compared to the 
charismatic   and   traditional   forms,   yet   ‘the   last   200   years   have   witnessed   the  propagation of the rational-legal form throughout the organisational populations inhabiting most   territorial  states,   if  not   in  extreme  form  then   in  mixtures  of   this   form’  
(DeLanda,   2006:   70).   As   such,   to   replace   “path   dependence”   with   trajectories   (or,   in  
Deleuze   and   Guattari’s   terms,   “lines   of   flight”)   through   possibility   space   is   to  acknowledge the potential for new diagrammatic forms, and to dislodge attachments to some ideal “best practice” models imported from other contexts,  other  “paths”. This is not to suggest that the movement from one attractor (universal singularity) to another is easy or quick. Understanding how change happens in social assemblages requires careful and sustained attention to their material and expressive components, and the processes that stabilize their identity: territorialisation and coding. As noted above, identifying these components and processes is an empirical task, and one in which 
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international organisations, like the World Bank with its considerable expert resources, can play an important role.   
(4) Reasons for reflexivity  As this thesis has emphasised, assemblages are created by processes of territorialisation characterised by the sharpening of boundaries and the homogenization of components, stabilised by processes of coding. Social assemblages can integrate new components as part of territorialising processes, but new components can also enter into assemblages through processes of deterritorialisation. The heterogeneity of assemblages means that all sorts of entities assemble in relations of exteriority, this includes cultural products like books and films, newspapers and radio shows, as well as scientific theories, discourses and social scientific analysis. Here texts do not represent reality, but enter into productive relations with other entities and social products.  As Deleuze and Guattari argue, this  is   ‘the book as assemblage with the outside, as against the book as 
image  of  the  world’ (2004: 25). In this light, a political economy analysis should not be taken as a representation of the reality of development, but as an assemblage with it. The research it motivates, the data it describes, enter into relations of exteriority with other entities.   In mapping and investigating assemblages it cannot therefore be the intention to create an objective image of the world (what  Deleuze  and  Guattari  call   ‘a  tracing’  (2004:  26)), but to create analyses “to  scale”  that enter into relations with other entities. This is seen in the influence that the very exercise of analysis, and the inputs necessary to it can have on the activities of real social actors (Nunberg et al, 2010). It is also clear in the way analyses circulate within organisations. Of  course  a  political  economy  analysis’s  claim  to  represent reality is important its role in processes of (de)coding or (de)territorialising will depend on the extent to which readers (a World Bank Executive Board member, a civil society organisation) believe it corresponds with the world but its claim to represent the world can only ever be an expressive function and not a truth claim. As such there remains a “drive to accuracy” in mapping, but also a non-constructivist and non-relativist account for why reflexivity is essential for the analysis. This is because where political economy analysis takes place international organisations will always be 
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part of the fitness landscape, if not part of assemblages populating that landscape. As such assemblage theory can help to place the analyst on the map, pointing with an insistent little arrow:  “you  are  here”.  
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 Conclusion    This thesis has argued that knowledge and expertise is crucial to the emergent legitimacy of international organisations, but in the case of anti-corruption expertise, although economic knowledge has helped produce an international regime and consensus against corruption, reforms in developing countries informed by this knowledge have been much less successful than hoped. As anti-corruption becomes a 
“corporate strategy” for the World Bank, and the UN adopts the rule of law as a presiding theme and area of action (United Nations, 2012), there is the potential that the lack of success associated with existing approaches to anti-corruption could undermine the legitimacy of these organisations. Acknowledging the lack of progress in combating corruption, and the insights from the new institutional economics that power and politics underpins economic institutions, the World Bank and donors are increasingly looking for ways to influence political processes to deliver positive population outcomes 
(“pro-poor  growth”). Political economy analysis has been identified as a key tool to help development agencies understand how politics influences economic processes in specific country, sector and project contexts. However, although there is potential for high quality analysis to assist project planning and implementation, there is a sense of frustration that the recommendations emerging from political economy analysis have 
been,  for  the  most  part,  ‘highly  conventional’  (Desai,  2011:  49).    Commentators on development practice have suggested that integrating concepts from complexity science (Copestake and Williams, 2012; Ramalingam et al, 2009), and 
adopting  an  “upside-down”  approach  to  development  (Institute of Development Studies, 2010) offer potentially fruitful avenues for exploration. However, this thesis has argued in order to do so, it is necessary to address the philosophical implications of both 
complexity  and  an   “upside  down”  approach   for  mainstream  anti-corruption discourse, which is dominated by the positivist assumptions of neo-classical economics. Manuel 
DeLanda’s assemblage theory offers a social ontology in which the relevance of complexity concepts for social analysis can be developed, and a way of thinking that 
emphasises   how   social   entities   emerge   from   “the   bottom  up” without reducing causal 
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explanations to individual human beings and their interests. To date assemblage theory has been used predominantly in the critical mode. This thesis has made some initial suggestions about how it might be employed in the problem-solving mode traditionally dominated by positivist social sciences like neoclassical economics and international relations neoliberalism. It argues that political economy analysis could be improved by assemblage thinking, that is, by identifying how social entities in particular social contexts enter into relations of exteriority in networks and hierarchical authority structures that have emergent properties irreducible to the components on which they depend for their existence. This also emphasises that international organisations, like the World Bank, are in the business of creating new assemblages. Through their constitutive power they:  
…define new interests and new tasks (such as protecting human rights, promoting development , peacekeeping), as well as to constitute and legitimate new actors to carry out those tasks (human rights monitors, technical assistance missions, peacekeepers). In this way, they create new interlocutors and new constituencies, 
both   for   themselves   and   for  other   actors,   notably   states’   (Barnett   and  Finnemore,  2004: 164).   But international organisations do so in complex social situations, where many different social entities are interacting and adapting, and where the outcomes of such constitutive power cannot be predicted. The social accountability initiatives of the World Bank, for example, seek to constitute civil society actors as monitors of government service delivery, integrating them into assemblages with governmental organisations in relations of exteriority that may limit their ability to contest rights to democratic accountability.   Assemblage thinking can help   international   organisation   staff   to   come   up   with   ‘new  
ideas  and  new  solutions  in  policy  debates’  (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 162) to, in the 
words  of  the  new  World  Bank  president  Jim  Yong  Kim,  “bend  the  arc of  history”  (2013),  but it comes with its own set of obstacles, including that assemblages, like complex systems, ‘are   far   harder   to   model   and   analyse’   and   ‘this   carries   cost   implications in terms of time, money and skills that  are  far  from  trivial’  (Ramalingam, 2008: 11-12). Not 
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only is there much work to be done to develop research methods for identifying social assemblages, the (de)territorialising and (de)coding processes that operate to (de)stabilise their identity, and their causal powers and effects, but the reflexivity that assemblage theory requires makes it difficult for international organisations to efface 
their  active  power  in  political  situations.  While  this  provides  a  more  “accurate”  reading  of the social context, it can have deterritorialising effects on international organisations as rational-legal bureaucracies, and may require them to seek new ways of expressing legitimacy. This is a line of flight, a blind search for new forms in a world where international organisations themselves are a relatively new population of entities. International organisations like the World Bank form part of new global assemblages that provide resources and constraints to other actors, and act themselves as causal agents in world politics. Assemblage theory also implies a long game: the influence of Fernand Braudel7 on   DeLanda’s   work   should   be   a   caution   to   those   who   see   in  
assemblage  theory  a  series  of  “quick  wins”  for  development.    Importantly, however, thinking with assemblage theory does not imply a wholesale renovation of anti-corruption knowledge and expertise. Rather it can provide a theoretical basis for the experience-derived turn to context and politics in anti-corruption practice and can integrate empirical insights from the new institutional economics while discarding its positivist foundations. The lure of predictive power that positivist social theory extends is illusory, but it does indicate that to social actors, valuable knowledge is knowledge that enables action. This is particularly important for 
international  organisations  whose  job  it  is  to  “do  something”: to define and seek ways to address problems. There are concerns within the World Bank that the political turn in anti-corruption and governance discourse can create perverse incentive for borrower countries and donors to avoid pushing for potentially more effective reforms if they claim they are not   politically   “feasible” (Fritz et al, 2009). As such, political economy analysis risks becoming redundant if it fails to produce the kinds of recommendations for action that are required for the World Bank to express the legitimacy of its authority. Examining the philosophical assumptions underpinning expert knowledge can open a creative space for considering “how”   approaches   to   anti-corruption and governance                                                         7 Fernand Braudel (1902-1985) was an influential member of (French) Annales School of historiography. 
His  work  is  associated  with  “geological”  interpretations  of  history, emphasising large scale and long run socioeconomic processes. 
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reforms should be approached before setting out to sense new  intimations  of  “what”  to  do about it. As   Barnett   and   Finnemore   note,   the   ‘[a]pplication   of   rules,   norms,   and  
scripts   to  new  situations  always  requires   some  creativity  and   invention’.  They  suggest  
that  this  ‘creative  agency  is  more  likely  to  occur  at  moments  of  rapid  global  change  as  IO  [international organisation] staff draw from existing bureaucratic culture to extend and 
project   their   authority’   (2004:   162).   Whether   the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, or the rapid political changes in the Middle East provide a moment for creative agency is an open question, but the persistence of corruption, and the intensification of elite domination in many societies it enables, makes the dire need of such creativity all too real.   
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